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The discipline of labor economics has now accepted the proposition that 
labor is a quasi-fixed factor of production. The basic idea can be traced to 
J. M. Clark (1923) in Studies in  the Economics of Overhead Costs. The 
fixed cost hypothesis was developed to explain the occupational differ- 
ences in employment and wage rate responses to cyclical fluctuations in 
the aggregate level of  output and employment. The early models did not 
provide satisfactory explanations for the macroeconomic behavior  of 
unemployment and money wages.  Search and contract theories were 
constructed to fill this void. Hall emphasized the importance of long-term 
“permanent” jobs which provide the support for contract theories of the 
labor market. But contract and search theories must ultimately rest on a 
foundation  of  fixed  costs  of  one sort  or  another.  Prudent  research 
strategy calls for us to inquire about the factors that can explain why firms 
and individuals choose to invest in specialized resources which generate 
these fixed costs. 
I shall advance the hypothesis that specialized labor and fixed employ- 
ment costs are derivatives of an organization of production that reflects 
the heterogeneity of firms. A comparatively small number of firms grow 
to extraordinarily large sizes because they are controlled by exceptionally 
talented and able entrepreneurs. They assemble large production teams 
by adopting rigid, batch assembly line production processes that are most 
efficient for the volume production of  standardized goods. Each giant 
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firm is characterized by a sufficiently  unique organization that can justify 
and sustain the substantial investments in recruiting and firm-specific 
training which are optimal only for the largest firms. Employee com- 
pensation packages are designed to attract and retain specifically trained 
workers. Those employees who join and remain with the giant firms are 
rewarded by implicit contracts that guarantee stable wages and tenured 
employment. Other individuals who prefer the flexibility and adaptability 
of  small establishments must accept the risks of  employment instability 
due to the shorter life expectancy of small firms. Rigid production tech- 
niques and intertemporal substitutions of maintenance activities provide 
an explanation for Okun’s law which deals with the procyclical move- 
ments of  labor productivity. The empirical evidence and theory devel- 
oped in this paper support the conclusion that the concept of firm-specific 
human capital is only applicable to one sector of  the economy, namely, 
the large firms with one thousand or more employees. 
2.1  The Quasi-Fixity of Labor 
Once the holding of unused productive capacity was conceived as “idle 
overhead,” it was inevitable that the idea should be extended to human 
powers as well as to the powers of physical plant and machinery. . . . 
Wherever a laborer has invested time and money in specialized train- 
ing, the result is in a senseJixed capital  which is useful in one occupation 
and in no other and which must earn whatever return it can because the 
investment cannot be withdrawn and moved into some other line of 
business. In such a case, it seems fairly clear that labor involves an 
overhead cost. (J. M. Clark, 1923, p. 15) 
This excerpt contains the ideas of  labor as a quasi-fixed factor and of 
firm-specific human capital. 
The cyclical behavior of labor markets exhibits an uneven incidence of 
unemployment, a compression of occupational wage differentials in the 
upswing, persistent differences in labor turnover rates, and hiring /firing 
practices that smack of  discrimination. If  the partial elasticity of substitu- 
tion of  skilled labor A for the fixed factor capital K is less than that of 
unskilled labor B for K (aAK<  usK),  the larger cyclical shifts in demand 
for unskilled labor can be explained by  a neoclassical theory of  factor 
demands. However, that theory cannot explain lags in turning points or 
differences in labor turnover. These phenomena can better be under- 
stood by introducing the concept of  labor as a quasi-fixed factor. 
Labor cost contains two components-a  variable wage that must be 
paid to  obtain a worker’s services and a lixed employment cost that a firm 
incurs to acquire and train a specific stock of employees. In equilibrium, 
labor’s marginal value product  (MVP) is equated to the sum of  the 65  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
expected  wage  plus  the amortization of  the fixed  employment  cost, 
q = F/C(1 + r)-‘; MVP = W + q. Since q is a sunk cost, workers in a 
particular skill will be retained as long as MVP exceeds the variable wage. 
Workers with high degrees of fixity, meaning high ratios [q/(W  + q)],  thus 
experience smaller relative fluctuations in factor demands. Further, the 
returns to an investment in fixed employment costs can be increased by 
adopting policies that reduce labor turnover. One should therefore find a 
negative correlation between an occupation’s degree of fixity and its labor 
turnover rate. The empirical tests generally confirmed the implications of 
a theory of  labor as a quasi-fixed factor.‘ 
2.2  Unemployment and  Rigid Wages 
Quasi-fixity cannot explain the persistence of  involuntary unemploy- 
ment and the sluggish response of wages to changes in aggregate demand. 
I shall not try to survey the substantial literature that has been motivated 
by these phenomena. I shall instead provide a brief review of the salient 
facts and summarize my assessment of  search and contract theories. The 
value  of  search and contracts obviously depends on the duration  of 
employment relations, which is discussed in section 2.2.4. 
2.2.1  The Macrobehavior of  the Private Business Sector 
In the postwar period, 1947-79, output of the private business sector 
almost trebled from an index of 48.7 to 144.0 (table 2.1). Fluctuations in 
output and labor input (measured by man-hours or unemployment rates) 
were only weakly correlated. Procyclical movements in labor productiv- 
ity  and hours per employee accounted for much  of  the year-to-year 
changes in output. Hall (1980) emphasized the absence of  market clear- 
ing adjustments in money wages; the simple correlation between annual 
rates of  changes in man-hours and wages was -. 123  for the decade of the 
1970s. Data for the longer time series, 1947-79, suggest that the economy 
may have undergone a structural change, but the two key puzzles which 
were emphasized by Hall still remain. We must still explain why wages 
fail to clear the labor market and why labor productivity follows a strong 
procyclical pattern. 
2.2.2 
Idleness can be efficient. Stigler (1962) and Alchian (1969) recognized 
that search was costly, but unemployed workers willingly incurred these 
costs to find and secure better paying jobs. In Hutt’s (1977) terminology, 
an unemployed worker is in pseudoidleness while he is searching for work 
or serving the productive function of availubility-awaiting  a call to fill a 
specialized job.* 
Search and the Pseudoidleness of  Prospectors Table 2.1  Productivity and Related Variables” 
Hourly  Adult 
Total  Cornpen-  Price  Pop.  Labor  Employed 
output  Hours  sation  Deflator  (20-64)  Force  Persons 








































































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Report of the President, 1980, table B-37, p. 246. 
"The first four columns are indexes with 1967 as the base. The last three columns are in thousands. 68  Walter Y.  Oi 
When actively searching for work, the situation is that he is really 
investing in himself by working on his own account without immediate 
remuneration. He is prospecting. He is doing what he would pay an 
efficient employment agency to do if the course of politics had allowed 
this sort of institution to emerge in modern society. He judges that the 
search for a better opening was worth the risk of immediately forgone 
income. If his relatives or his friends or  the state is keeping him, then in 
a sense they also may sometimes be regarded as investing in him, and it 
may still be wrong to think of  him as idle. But this condition is very 
difficult to distinguish in practice from the various types of  “preferred 
idleness.” Thus, unemployment insurance may lessen his incentive to 
find work, and an apparent or supposed search for the best employ- 
ment opportunity may be a mask for what is known as loafing. (Hutt 
Search and turnover models have been severely criticized by K. Clark 
and Summers (1979). These models imply large flows into and out of 
unemployment with only a thin tail of  long unemployment spells. Hall 
(1972) figured that 3.3 points of the unemployment rate could be attrib- 
uted to normal turnover and search. Estimates for completed spells of 
unemployment by Clark and Summers sharply reduce this figure to only 
0.25 percent.  Further, 64 percent of  job changes were made with no 
intervening spell of unemployment. According to Rosenfeld (1977), an 
individual who was unemployed for four weeks or more devoted only 
seventeen hours a month to search. Only 35 percent of  successful job 
seekers found their jobs through direct applications to employers. Fi- 
nally, most workers take the first job offer they receive, and the jobs 
which they take are held for only short periods lasting less than two years. 
In the light of these facts, Clark and Summers conclude that it is irrational 
for an unemployed worker to remain idle while he is searching for a better 
I see at least three problems that may limit the applicability of  tradi- 
tional search models. First, these models posit an underlying distribution 
of wage offers and assume that workers search for better paying jobs. The 
wage rate is, however, simply a proxy for the total utility of employment 
at different firms. Wage information can be cheaply communicated, but 
prospectors must visit heterogeneous firms to ascertain the quality of 
employment. Second, most models assume, for analytic ease, that indi- 
viduals are alike. Search costs and the returns of  search will obviously 
vary across individuals. Third, the models neglect firm heterogeneity. 
Search is surely a reciprocal process in which the unemployed seek jobs, 
and firms search for qualified applicants for vacant jobs. 
2.2.3 
I can identify at least four reasons that can explain the existence of 
long-term employment agreements: (1) sharing the risks of  uncertain 
1977, pp. 83-84) 
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product demands, (2) sharing the risks of  uncertain labor productivity, 
(3) agency costs, and (4) transaction costs of  which the most important 
are the fixed costs of recruiting and training. If  workers are risk averse 
and firms have  a comparative advantage  in  risk  bearing, a mutually 
advantageous agreement can be struck wherein part of  the risk of em- 
ployment instability is shifted to the firm. Gordon (1974) and Baily (1974) 
appealed to this principle to rationalize implicit long-term contracts. But 
what is to prevent postcontractual opportunistic behavior? Compliance is 
hopefully assured by reputation.  In short, contract theories must pre- 
sume that each firm is sufficiently long-lived to have a reputation that is 
worth protecting. 
If  productivity is uncertain, payments by  results and spot contracts 
result in uncertain labor incomes. Given risk aversion, F. Smith (1977) 
has shown that a long-term contract with rigid wages and tenured em- 
ployment will dominate a contract with fluctuating wages. An implication 
of  this model is that, in  competitive equilibrium, junior workers are 
underpaid, while senior (unsuccessful) workers receive a wage that ex- 
ceeds their marginal value pr~duct.~ 
The delegation of  authority is unavoidably accompanied by  agency 
costs of  the type analyzed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The costs of 
monitoring and malfeasance in a principal-agent relation can be reduced 
by negotiating long-term contracts that contain substantial elements of 
deferred compen~ation.~  The presence of  long-term contracts and de- 
ferred pay confound the econometric task of  estimating the empirical 
relation between pay and marginal value products. 
A common thread running through these contract theories is that there 
is more than one dimension to “work.” Risk sharing involves a package 
in which the worker accepts a lower stable wage in return for an implicit 
insurance policy that yields income smoothing in an uncertain world. In 
the Becker-Stigler (1974) model, one can imagine that the firm demands 
a tied bundle consisting of  an agent’s work effort plus the tied risks of 
potential losses due to malfeasance or shirking. Specific human capital 
also involves a tie linking a trained worker to  his unique work setting. The 
forging of these ties in implicit or explicit long-term employment arrange- 
ments is presumably advantageous to both parties. The firm’s reputation 
is  allegedly the support which persuades workers to believe that the 
promises will be kept, while deferred benefits induce workers into keep- 
ing their part of the bargain. These implications suggest contract theories 
should only apply to those firms with credible reputations. 
2.2.4  Job Tenure and Turnover 
A search model examines the behavior  of  an individual seeking a 
permanent job, while contract theory describes the behavior of  a firm 
that tries to design pay and employment policies that will attract and 70  Walter Y. Oi 
retain “permanent” workers. Employment relations are established and 
broken, and these labor flows detqrmine a distribution of job tenures. If 
risk sharing and mobility costs are important to workers, and if  fixed 
employment costs are significant, we should observe long, mean dura- 
tions of job tenure. The gross flow statistics reveal high labor turnover 
rates which seem to contradict the underpinnings of search and contract 
theories. 
Labor turnover is costly, and many economists have argued that much 
can be learned by  studying the organization of  Japanese firms which 
purportedly promise their employees guaranteed “lifetime” employment 
contracts. The myth of  the protected and coddled Japanese worker was 
so pervasive that I never questioned its validity. A very different picture 
is painted by Koike (1978)$ 
Those who deserve to be regarded as having “lifetime employment” 
are not Japanese workers, but those in the organized sector of  the 
United States with five or more years of continuous service. (p. 46) 
The data assembled by Koike (pp. 64-65)  reveal that the percentage of 
employed persons with fifteen or more years of  continuous service is 
larger in the United States. The percentage with ten or more years was 
around 34 percent in both countries, while the percentage with less than 
one year was larger in the United States. I suspect that the wider disper- 
sion of  job tenures in the United States can partially be explained by 
differences in the size distribution of  firms. 
Using estimated  marginal  retention  rates, Hall (1982) constructed 
distributions of “eventual” job tenures. A representative worker can be 
expected to hold ten jobs over a lifetime. Most jobs are of short duration, 
but by the age of thirty, 40 percent of employed persons will be at a job 
that they will hold for twenty or more years. There are obvious sex 
differences; 50 percent of  thirty-year-old men will find permanent job 
attachments compared to only 25 percent of  thirty-year-old  women. 
Director and Doctors (1976) found that among blue-collar workers at 
three large factories, blacks had slightly longer job tenures than whites. 
Hall’s distributions, which pertain to random samples of  employed per- 
sons, confirm this finding: namely, race is unrelated to job tenure. The 
picture of the labor market implicit in these job tenure distributions is one 
of turbulence during the first five to ten years in the labor force. Young 
persons move from job to job as they look for a “permanent” job. With 
increasing age, larger fractions eventually settle into a job that will last for 
twenty  or more years. Data from the May  1979 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) reveal some interesting interactions between job tenure 
and firm size which are explored in section 2.3. 
Our concerns over unemployment and rigid wages have promoted the 
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fixed costs. The magnitude of  these fixed costs obviously varies across 
individuals and firms. A marginal firm, whose survival probabilities are 
slim, is unlikely to make large investments in recruiting and training. An 
individual with few assets and general talents will not incur high search 
costs. Search and contract theories are only applicable to a sector of the 
economy for which these fixed costs are significant. Attention is directed 
in the next section to the characteristics of  firms and workers that put 
them into this sector. 
2.3  The Production and Compensation of  Specialized Employees 
Training and goods are joint products. Firms “produce” specifically 
trained employees whose internal value to the firm exceeds their external 
value in an outside labor market. Firm-specific human capital and the 
discrepancy between internal and external values can only be sustained 
when the host firms are sufficiently differentiated  from one another. 
Variations in entrepreneurial ability can generate a distribution of  firms 
that differ in size and organization. The very large firms achieve the 
economies of volume production by installing rigid, specialized produc- 
tion plants. The resulting organizations yield short-run factor demands 
that produce procyclical patterns in labor productivity. Less able en- 
trepreneurs, who control smaller production teams, occupy a different 
segment of  the “product line.” They survive by  assembling adaptable 
production teams that utilize general-purpose equipment and employ 
workers with general human capital. Firm-specific human capital is a 
phenomenon that is only observed in that sector of the economy consist- 
ing of very large firms. The labor market in this part of the economy does 
not conform to the neoclassical theory of  factor markets. 
2.3.1  Fixed Employment Costs and the Joint Production 
of  Training and Goods 
The full costs of  quasi-fixed labor inputs are the sum of  variable and 
fixed components. Wages and fringe benefits that make up total em- 
ployee compensation are usually included in the first c~mponent.~  The 
fixed employment costs, which represent outlays for recruiting and train- 
ing, are likely to be higher, the greater the specificity of the firm’s labor 
force. 
If a resource is specialized and specific to a firm, it earns an equilibrium 
return that contains an element of  economic rent. Its internal value will 
exceed its external value. Firms may purchase specialized resources from 
outside vendors, but the usual arrangement involves vertical integration 
wherein specific factors are “internally produced.”8 The firm that de- 
mands specially trained labor input will ordinarily find that specific train- 
ing can be most economically provided  through internal or in-house 72  Walter Y.  Oi 
production. It thus becomes a multiproduct firm that jointly produces 
goods and specific human capital. 
The costs of  producing  specific human  capital will  depend on the 
technology of production and the input prices which include the wages 
paid  to apprentice-trainees  and instructors, materials  costs,  and the 
opportunity costs of forgone output. If  S units of specific human capital 
are produced and supplied to each new hire, the gross return realized by 
the firm will be equal to the present value of increments to labor produc- 
tivity (in value terms) attributable to S. The gross returns will be larger, 
the lower the interest rate, and the greater the durability of  S.9 The 
optimum investment in firm-specific human capital is attained by equat- 
ing marginal costs to marginal returns. This investment is likely to vary 
across individuals and firms. More specific human capital will be invested 
in those individuals who have longer expected employment tenures and 
larger increments in productivity. If  apprentice-trainees agree to share 
the costs by accepting a lower wage during the training period (which 
translates into a fall in the price of  an input entering the production 
function), the marginal cost of  specific training falls thereby increasing 
the equilibrium investment in S. Other implications could be derived by 
placing more structure on the model.'o 
A firm hires individuals of varying abilities to perform different tasks, 
and the nature  of  the tasks will  surely affect the returns  to specific 
training. Orientation costs are, for example, small when the job involves 
simple tasks that are performed in more or less the same way in many 
firms. Other jobs that require the use of  specialized equipment or close 
cooperation with team members may demand extensive orientation and 
training. We have read about the highly valued clerk who through formal 
training and informal on-the-job experience has learned how to deal with 
the firm's best customers. Substantially more training must be supplied to 
those managers and supervisors who are asked to monitor performance, 
to train new employees, and to handle unanticipated departures from 
normal work routines. These examples suggest that specific human capi- 
tal is largely concentrated among highly paid, skilled workers. 
Individuals who have a greater capacity to learn are likely to acquire 
larger stocks of  both types of  human capital. The marginal returns to 
specific human capital S are likely to be greater, the larger the supply of 
the cooperating input of  general human capital G. Equalization of  mar- 
ginal returns across individuals will  thus yield  a positive correlation 
between  S  and G. Further, general human capital  G determines an 
individual's external market wage W." The usual principles of  production 
can thus generate a positive association between the wage rate and the 
degree of  fixity. Moreover, the returns to a given investment in specific 
human capital are likely to vary across firms. Those firms that enjoy 
higher returns will realize greater gains by demanding more able workers 73  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
whose general human capital will have a complementary effect on the 
productivity of  specific human capital. This heterogeneity of  firms thus 
reinforces the tendency for wages to be positively correlated with invest- 
ments in firm-specific human capital. 
2.3.2  The Planning of  Production by Heterogeneous Firms 
The analysis of labor markets has explicitly recognized the presence of 
individual worker differences in both observable variables (education, 
job experience, race, sex, etc.) and unobservable traits (intelligence, 
honesty, perseverence, etc.) These differences operating through the 
supply side play important roles in explaining the dispersion in earnings, 
the differential  incidence of unemployment, job mobility, and so on. On 
the demand side, there are obvious differences among firms. Industrial 
differences  are usually explained  by  arguing that there  are different 
technical substitution opportunities embedded in the production func- 
tions applicable to different industries. However, firms in a given industry 
also differ in behavior and in the organization of production. These firm 
differences cannot be adequately explained by  our received theory of 
value. 
Economic theory only provides a loose definition for the concept of the 
firm. Coase (1937) persuasively argued that the firm is a viable organiza- 
tion because some resource allocations are more economically made by 
command rather than  by  market transactions. Alchian  and Demsetz 
(1972, p. 778) emphasized the role of coordinating team production when 
they wrote, “It [the firm] is the centralized contractual agent in a team 
productive process, not some superior authoritarian directive or disci- 
plinary power.” Following Kaldor (1934), I shall assume that the “cen- 
tralized contractual agent” can be equated to a single, firm-specific en- 
trepreneurial input.12  The quality and quantity of  this input will surely 
vary, and it is this variation which can explain the size distribution of 
firms. 
The Entrepreneurial Input in a Neoclassical Model 
Before turning to those aspects of production which deal with adapta- 
bility, specific training, and recruiting, attention is directed to a neoclas- 
sical model in which output Q is produced by combining three inputs: 
Capital K is purchased at a price R.  A firm that hires M workers of type 
p  obtains a labor input measured in  efficiency units of  N = pM. All 
entrepreneurs are endowed with the same fixed supply of calendar time H 
which can be allocated to coordinating production or monitoring worker 
performance. Monitoring is an essential joint input that must be supplied 74  Walter Y.  Oi 
by the entrepreneur to assure that each of  the M workers contributes p 
efficiency units of labor services.” Entrepreneurs are assumed to be alike 
as monitors, and they must devote h hours to monitor each worker. They 
do, however, differ in their capacity to coordinate production. These 
differences will be described by an entrepreneurial ability parameter  A 
which transforms the time allocated to coordinating and decision making 
into efficiency units of  managerial effort T.  The supply of  managerial 
effort which cooperates with the hired input is thus determined by entre- 
preneurial ability A and the number of  employees M: 
(2)  T=  AH = A(H -  h~). 
More productive workers can command higher wages along a market 
wage structure W(p)  with W(p) >  0. The profits of a competitive firm are 
thus given by 
(3)  n=PQ-RK-W(p)M. 
Inputs of  capital K and employees M,  as well as worker quality p, are 
chosen to maximize profits. The first-order conditions are 
(3a)  PfK=R, 
(3b)  p(pfN -  AhfT) = w(p) Or  ppfN = w(I*)  + 6  (6 =  > 
(3c)  PfN = WfF). 
This system of three equations determines the profit-maximizing values 
of (K,  M,  p). The properties of this model can be more easily understood 
by temporarily assuming that worker quality p is held constant. 
In equilibrium, the MVP of capital is equated to its price R. However, 
the MVP of  workers exceeds their wages by  an amount equal to the 
implicit monitoring cost 6 which represents the opportunity cost of divert- 
ing h hours of entrepreneurial time away from coordination to the super- 
vision of worker performance. The marginal rate of substitution of capital 
for workers  is  equated to relative  factor  prices where  the pertinent 
“price” of labor is its full cost, defined as the sum of the wage needed to 
obtain a worker’s services plus the opportunity cost of the time required 
to guarantee that the worker will contribute p.  efficiency units of  work 
effort:  l4 
dK -  FfN - WF) + 6 
dM  fK  R 
Firms that incur higher monitoring costs face a higher full price of labor. 
Consequently, they adopt more capital-intensive production techniques. 
Profits, in this model, are the returns to the quasi-fixed entrepreneurial 
input. If  the production function, equation (l),  is homogeneous of  the 75  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
first degree, profits in a competitive industry will be directly proportional 
to the shadow price of  entrepreneurial time:I5 
(5)  = PAfTH. 
Profits are positively related to  A and P, and inversely related to h,  R,  and 
W(p). A marginal entrepreneur is one whose ability level A,  is such that 
he realizes the same income from either pursuit, entrepreneur or worker; 
i.e., IT, = W.  Those whose entrepreneurial ability exceeds this threshold 
level (A >  A,)  will make up the supply of entrepreneurs, while the remain- 
ing individuals constitute the supply of  hired workers. The production 
function and the right tail of the frequency distribution of entrepreneurial 
abilities, +(h) to the right of  ho, jointly determine an equilibrium size 
distribution of  firms. The output supplied by each firm is thus a function 
of  real input prices,  entrepreneurial ability, and the monitoring loss 
parameter, Q = Q[(R/P),  (WlP),  A, h].  In competitive market equilib- 
rium, the product price equates the industry supply, Q", to the market 
demand, Qd  = D(P): 
P 
Q" = / Q($  $,  A,  h)Q(A)dA  = D(P). 
A0 
Inframarginal entrepreneurs with high values of  A earn economic rents 
(IT -  W) that are not eliminated by competitive market forces. Although 
higher entrepreneurial abilities entail higher monitoring costs, output, 
employment, and profits are positively related to ability A.  As a conse- 
quence, more able entrepreneurs control larger firms. 
For a given worker type, say pl, inputs of  K and M are demanded so 
that the constrained marginal cost 7 is equated to the product price: 
W1  =P  [W1= W(px)].  -R 
y=-= 
fK  PlfN-  Xhfr 
The opportunities to vary worker  quality introduces a new degree of 
freedom. The input mix for 7 need not correspond to a global minimum 
of  costs. If  the quality margin is equated to the other two margins, the 
firm attains a global maximum of profits described by the equality of  the 
unconstrained marginal cost to price: 
R  W(Cl.1  -  W(F) -p. 
y=-= 
fK  pfN-  AhfT  fN 
The nature of  the full equilibrium is clarified by examining the way in 
which the choice of  worker quality affects the costs of the labor input. A 
given input of labor services measured in efficiency units can be produced 
by various combinations of numbers M and qualities p. The full cost of 
labor is the sum of  wages and implicit monitoring costs: 76  Walter Y. Oi 
c = [W(p) + 6]M  = [W(p) + 61 -  (3 
We can derive the marginal cost of a move to  higher quality accompanied 
by a decrease in numbers, holding N constant: 
The sign of  (dC/dp)  will depend on p  and the implicit monitoring cost 6 
which is higher for larger firms. There is an ability level XI for which pl 
would have been that firm’s optimal choice of worker quality. A firm with 
a higher ability entrepreneur (AA  >A,)  incurs a higher monitoring cost so 
that p1  W’(p1)< W(pl) + 6*.  The A,  firm can reduce the full costs of 
labor by  substituting quality for quantity. In equilibrium, the worker 
productivity which minimizes full labor cost satisfies the condition that 
the marginal cost of quality equals the full cost of  an additional worker: 
Entrepreneurs will locate along the wage structure  W(p) in a manner 
analogous to the hedonic price model of  Rosen (1974). Large firms that 
incur higher monitoring costs will demand more productive workers who 
command higher wages, requiring less monitoring per efficiency unit of 
labor services. The equilibrium market wage structure must equilibrate 
the relative demands and supplies for workers of varying productivities. 
Moreover, it must exhibit increasing returns to quality, meaning that if 
individual A is twice as productive as B,  A must receive a wage that is 
more than twice B’s wage.I6  More productive workers are matched with 
more able entrepreneurs, thereby generating a positive relation between 
wages  and firm  size. This assignment of  workers to firms is socially 
optimal in the sense that it minimizes the full social cost of  producing 
monitored labor services. 
A displacement of  equilibrium results in distributional effects among 
the firms in a given industry as well as allocative effects across industries. 
The nature of  these adjustments can be described with the aid of  an 
illustration. Suppose that a wage tax is placed on workers in a particular 
industry. In a Marshallian analysis, the “representative firm” will con- 
tract output, profits will fall, and capital will be substituted for labor. The 
industry demand for capital will decline if the elasticity of  substitution is 
less than the price elasticity of  demand. In the presence of heterogeneous 
firms, these conclusions have to be qualified. Marginal entrepreneurs, 
whose abilities are only slightly above the threshold level ho, are driven 
out of  the market as  profits fall below the alternative wage that they could 
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surviving firms whose higher laborkapital ratios cause larger upward 
shifts in their marginal cost curves. For the industry as a whole, the 
adjustment in product price due to the tax, will depend on four factors: 
(a) production technology, (b) the price elasticity of the product demand 
curve, (c) the increase in the threshold ability level A.  due to the tax, and 
(d) the frequency distribution of  abilities +(A).  A dispersion of  entre- 
preneurial abilities could thus result in a situation where the smaller firms 
cease or contract production, while the larger firms actually expand their 
output, employment, and profits.” 
Differences in entrepreneurial ability can generate an equilibrium size 
distribution of  firms even though all entrepreneurs have access to the 
same production technology and to common, perfectly competitive fac- 
tor markets. Ability in my  model is not “Hicks neutral.” Specifically, 
talented entrepreneurs have a comparative disadvantage at monitoring. 
As a consequence, they try to economize on monitoring by  adopting 
capital-intensive  production  techniques  and  hiring  more  productive 
workers. These are implications that can be empirically tested. 
Monitoring, Training, and Productivity 
Monitoring costs could be reduced if production could be organized so 
that workers are paid by “results.” The production methods that allow 
for piece-rate compensation may exclude techniques that can realize the 
economies of  specialization and team production.18  Team production 
requires the joint input of  monitoring to prevent shirking. The costs of 
monitoring teams cannot be easily allocated to individual team members. 
The determination of  an optimal level of  monitoring thus involves ele- 
ments of  the problem of public goods. 
The production of specialized teams ordinarily requires specific train- 
ing that raises a worker’s productivity in only one particular firm. If  some 
minimal amount of  firm-specific human capital is required to become a 
team member, what determines the manner and timing of its production? 
With respect to general human capital, Ben-Porath (1967) showed that if 
an individual maximizes utility, a rising marginal cost curve will generate 
a time path of investments in human capital that are spread out over time. 
The stock of  capital will increase at a decreasing rate, resulting in the 
familiar concave age-earnings profile. A firm’s investments in specific 
human capital ought to follow a similar path, increasing at a diminishing 
rate as a function of  length of  service. Further, if  the returns to specific 
human capital are shared, productivity and wages should both increase 
with job tenure. Medoff and Abraham (1981) have challenged the valid- 
ity of  this model. They reported that wages within a job grade increase 
with tenure, but productivity measured by supervisory ratings or physical 
output rates is  unrelated to job experience. Wages are evidently not 78  Walter Y.  Oi 
determined by the equilibrium returns to human capital and, by implica- 
tion, they have to be explained in some other way, such as risk sharing or 
paternalism. 
The Medoff-Abraham conclusion rests on the tacit assumption that 
workers are like single product firms; i.e., secretaries type, roofers lay 
shingles, and scientists publish articles. In reality, most workers resemble 
multiproduct firms that jointly supply several products.  In addition to 
typing, a secretary may be responsible for organizing the office, training 
new employees, and being available for service as a temporary replace- 
ment for an absentee. Firm-specific training is not intended to increase 
typing speed. It is designed to improve performance in those aspects of 
the job that are unique to the firm. The option value of  this backup 
capability (which is similar to Hutt’s example of an idle worker perform- 
ing the productive function  of  “availability”)  should  be  included  in 
measuring a worker’s total productivity. Additionally, a worker who is 
reliable  and requires less monitoring has a higher net product which 
cannot be measured by simply observing his gross product. These related, 
firm-specific dimensions of workers’ value to their employers are largely 
neglected in conventional measures of  labor productivity. Reliance on 
conventional measures  thus  tends  to understate  the impact  of  firm- 
specific training on total labor productivity.I9 
Specialization and  Team Production 
A firm can realize the gains from specialization by organizing produc- 
tion  around units  and teams.  The output of  the entire team can be 
observed, but the marginal contribution of  a particular worker is not 
easily ascertained because  of  (a) interdependence in  the production 
function and (b) variations in the supply of  work effort. If  effort and 
performance are to be properly compensated, someone has to monitor 
and meter worker performance.  In the Alchian-Demsetz  model, the 
entrepreneur is the specialist who detects shirking and metes out rewards. 
The delegation of  authority in a principal-agent relation is unavoidably 
accompanied  by  shirking  and  incompatible  incentives  that  produce 
“agency costs.” Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs 
(monitoring, bonding, and the residual loss) constitute an efficient alloca- 
tion of  resources. Without them, a firm could not obtain and retain the 
services of  agents and employees who have comparative advantages in 
performing certain tasks. In short, agency costs have to be incurred if 
a firm is to achieve the requisite size and organizational structure that 
are  needed  to  exploit  the  economies  of  specialization  and  volume 
production. 
In the neoclassical model discussed earlier, all firms used the same 
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firms in a given industry appear to produce slightly differentiated prod- 
ucts.  Large firms specialize in the production  of  standardized  goods, 
while small firms supply customized goods that are produced in small 
batches. 
Standardized goods are most efficiently produced by  combining spe- 
cialized capital with a disciplined labor force that will conform to pre- 
scribed work  schedules.  Production  is  characterized  by  a putty  clay 
technology in which capital can be substituted for labor in the ex ante 
planning stage, but once in place, machines and men are employed in 
virtually fixed proportions which simplifies the monitoring task.  The 
rigidity of  this organization  seems well  suited to exploit the volume 
economies emphasized by Alchian (1959)  .20 
If  a firm expects to sell only fifty units of  a good, it will choose an 
adaptable production technique. If, however, the planned volume is one 
hundred thousand units, production will be organized around an assem- 
bly line.” Specialized, durable machines will be designed for batch pro- 
duction, and these machines will be operated by fixed complements of 
workers. Monitoring costs can be reduced when workers are compelled 
to adhere to the same inflexible work schedules and when the opportuni- 
ties for discretionary behavior are limited by a fixed-proportions technol- 
ogy. To the extent that worker preferences vary, the lower monitoring 
costs are not a windfall. Large firms must pay  a compensating wage 
difference to attract marginal team members.’* 
The coordination of  very large production teams is facilitated by de- 
veloping detailed job descriptions. Job applicants are tested and inter- 
viewed, and prior work histories are carefully reviewed to determine if 
the applicant’s qualifications meet the prescribed job specifications. Ap- 
plicants are passed over and job vacancies are kept open until a suitable 
match is found. Small firms which have lower monitoring costs and more 
adaptable production teams are able to fill job vacancies more quickly 
because the requirements of the job can be more easily modified to fit the 
applicant’s qualifications. The relative rigidities of production plans thus 
predict that the ratio of applicants to job vacancies will be higher at larger 
firms and for those positions that have tighter, inflexible job specifi- 
cations.  23 
The new employees  at very large firms are likely to receive more 
firm-specific training. But training here must be broadly defined to in- 
clude the acquisition of new skills (e.g., learning how to operate a word 
processor or a forklift truck) as well as the adaptation to a particular 
production process (meaning compliance with prescribed working prac- 
tices or learning preferred ways to perform certain jobs). When all of a 
team’s members are more or less alike and follow standardized work 
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be delegated to subordinate~.~~  The fixed costs of assembling anti training 
a homogeneous labor force may not be warranted for small firms that 
have shorter, uncertain lives. 
Small firms are drawn to a segment of the industry product line contain- 
ing what can be called customized goods. Products are supplied in small 
batches and are often differentiated to meet idiosyncratic demands. A 
firm in this market should assemble an adaptable production team which 
can easily adjust to changing demands. I have argued earlier that the 
capital to labor ratio will be smaller because the lower monitoring cost 
reduces the full cost of labor. The lower capital intensity of smaller firms 
is furtkcr reinforced if  substitutions across differentiated products are 
more easily made by moving men rather than machines. Part-time work- 
ers can be more efficiently  employed by small firms which are continually 
adjusting to changes in the level and composition of productive activities. 
The virtual absence of  firm-specific training at small firms can be ex- 
plained  by  the adaptability and generality of  production  and by  the 
shorter expected lives of  these firms. 
Every industry contains firms of varying sizes and types. At one end of 
the spectrum, little companies produce goods in small batches by using 
labor-intensive  adaptable techniques  and by  hiring low-wage workers 
with  general human  capital.  At the other extreme, very  large firms 
specialize in the volume production of standardized goods. Production is 
organized  around  assembly lines  (or fixed  plants  designed for  large 
batches) that are characterized by (a) ex post fixed factor proportions, (b) 
rigid work schedules,  (c) detailed job descriptions, (d) homogeneous 
inputs, (e) high capital utilization rates achieved through multiple shifts, 
and (f) quantum adjustments to changing demand conditions. The com- 
position of  a firm’s product line and the organization of production are 
thus determined in a manner that maximizes the returns to the scarce 
entrepreneurial input. 
2.3.3  Short-Run Cyclical Adjustments and Okun’s Law 
The fixed cost hypothesis was originally advanced to explain different 
employment and wage responses to cyclical changes in aggregate de- 
mand. The literature in the last two decades has examined a broader 
range of  issues including search and contract theories, labor turnover, 
equilibrium unemployment rates, the duration of  job tenures, and, last 
but not least, Okun’s law which dealt with the cyclical behavior of labor 
productivity. Specifically, Arthur Okun found that a 1 percent decrease 
in the unemployment rate (which is approximately equal to a 1  percent 
increas:  in the aggregate labor input) was accompanied by  a 3 percent 
increase in aggregate output. This empirical regularity is contrary to a 
naive production function model in which capital is fixed in the short run, 
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offered a conjectural explanation wherein labor markets are dominated 
by workers on long-term contracts who felicitously  vary their work efforts 
in a procyclical fashion. The background model is one where the effective 
labor input is a function of work effort which, in turn, responds positively 
to changes in product demand.z5  A durable labor input may play  an 
important role in Okun’s law, but the elusive concept of  “work effort” 
can, I believe, be replaced by a more plausible argument that appeals to 
an efficient intertemporal allocation of specifically trained workers. 
Short-run adjustments to demand shifts will  be determined by  the 
production technology, factor supply conditions, and opportunities for 
product substitutions. I shall direct attention to two themes that have not 
been adequately developed in the literature and that go a long way in 
explaining Okun’s law. The first is concerned with the organization of 
volume production in which zero ex post factor substitutions (fixed factor 
proportions) are a consequence of volume production. The second theme 
extends the idea of  joint production to the intertemporal allocation of 
quasi-fixed factors to market and nonmarket activities. 
The essence of the first theme can be found in the peak load pricing 
model and is implicit in the regenerative growth model of  Gordon and 
Walton (1982).26  In the Steiner (1957) model, outputs in peak and slack 
periods are produced by  combining capital and labor in fixed (one-to- 
one) proportions; X,  = Ki  = Li  for j = 1,2. Capital is specialized with no 
alternative use, while the variable labor input is general. If  demands 
produce a firm peak (XI = K and X2  <  K),  the outputkapital ratio is less 
than unity in the slack period. As the firm moves from slack to peak 
periods, the  outputkapital ratio rises, but no one would point to this as an 
example of  increasing returns. 
The application of  the peak load model to Okun’s law is clarified by 
assuming that there are three inputs: specific labor A,  variable general 
labor B, and specific capital  K. If  one unit of  A  is  required  for the 
maintenance of one unit of K whether it is or is not in use, the labor input 
in the peak period is L1  = (A  + B,) where B1  = XI.  In the slack period, 
the labor input falls to L2 = (A  + B2)  where B2 = X2  <  Xl. The A labor is 
specialized and is retained during slack periods. As the firm moves from 
slack to peak periods, the output/labor ratio climbs because the A labor 
is, in a sense, more efficiently utilized during peak periods. 
The peak load model has been extended by Turvey (1968), Wenders 
(1976), and others to allow for a portfolio of  diverse technologies. Capi- 
tal-intensive plants that yield the lowest full-cycle costs are fully utilized 
in all periods, while standby plants with lower capitalAabor ratios are idle 
in slack periods but activated to meet peak demands. Large manufactur- 
ing firms seem to embrace a similar strategy. Those plants (or parts of  a 
plant)  that  are operated on multiple  shifts tend to be  highly capital 
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have lower ratios of  capital to variable labor inputs. In a cyclical down- 
turn, entire plants  and shifts are closed down, thereby producing  a 
countercyclical movement in the ratio of output to variable labor inputs. 
However, the diminishing returns to variable labor have to be combined 
with increasing returns to the quasi-fixed labor inputs in determining the 
cyclical behavior of  total labor productivity.*’  If  production entails fixed 
proportions in which quasi-fixed and variable labor inputs are combined 
with capital, short-run adjustments to demand shifts could generate time 
paths for output and employment that conform to Okun’s law. Further, 
since large firms are more likely to adopt putty clay technologies, the 
procyclical movements in labor productivity should be stronger for larger 
firms. 
The second theme  acknowledges that  all  large firms are vertically 
integrated, multiproduct enterprises. Resources at the command of  a 
firm can be allocated in at least three directions, namely, to the produc- 
tion of  (1) final goods Q, (2) firm-specific human capital, or (3) incre- 
ments to the value of  existing physical plant and equipment. The joint 
production of  training and goods has already been discussed, and the 
same idea can be extended to the joint internal production of  capital 
values. 
Machines do not run like the “one-hoss shays” of  some economic 
models. Depreciation is not exogenous, and investments (additions to the 
capital stock) do not always take the form of new capital goods purchased 
from outside vendors. Further, machines are not homogeneous, and one 
of  the important quality features is the probability of  breakdown. Re- 
sources are allocated to maintenance and repairs to sustain the service 
flows from capital and to raise the market value of  the existing capital 
stock. Each firm will choose a quality of capital (I shall emphasize age as a 
proxy for quality) and a level of maintenance inputs that maximize total 
profits. 
A firm can control the age distribution of  its capital stock through its 
choice of  age of  additions (new vs. used, and if  used, the age of  used 
equipment) and the age at which equipment is scrapped or sold in the 
used market. These decisions are made by comparing three components 
of  capital costs-amortization,  maintenance, and disruption. Since de- 
preciation  and  obsolescence rates decline with  age, newer  machines 
entail higher amortization charges. These may be offset, in part or in 
whole,  by  lower maintenance and disruption  costs, where  the latter 
include the opportunity costs of  forgone output and the costs of  any tied 
inputs that must be retained during any downtime. Small firms are more 
likely to  purchase used machines and to discard them at older ages for two 
reasons:  First, maintenance is a labor-intensive activity that must be 
closely supervised. The lower  “price”  of  maintenance  due to lower 
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amortization charges. Although the probability of a breakdown rises with 
increasing machine age, each disruption entails lower costs when the firm 
uses an adaptable production technique that allows for variable factor 
proportions.  Thus, small firms that have a comparative advantage in 
maintenance and in coping with disruptions, tend to own older machines. 
The giant firms that have large, inflexible production lines face higher 
maintenance prices. They willingly accept the higher amortization costs 
of new equipment in order to economize on monitoring and disruption 
costs. The optimal trade-offs of amortization versus maintenance/disrup- 
tion costs are determined by relative “prices” which happen to be related 
to firm size. The age structure of  a firm’s capital assets can thus be 
explained by the minimization of the sum of amortization, maintenance, 
and disruption costs.** 
The principle that maintenance can be substituted for investment is 
well known.29  Durable capital is scrapped at older ages in those countries 
where the wage rate is low in relation to the price of new equipment. This 
same principle applies to the intertemporal substitutions that a firm can 
make in response to cyclical fluctuations in relative factor prices and 
product demands. In a recession, the shadow prices of quasi-fixed special- 
ized resources fall, but firms continue to retain them. Product prices 
decline in relation to the implicit value of  internal investments. As a 
consequence, quasi-fixed inputs are shifted away from the production of 
goods  toward  internal  investments  in  specific human  capital  and in 
maintenance  of  physical capital.30  The market value of  capital assets 
increases  (or falls by  less than it otherwise would in the absence of 
increased  maintenance),  thereby  reducing  the  effective depreciation 
rate. These increments to capital values are all implicit and never appear 
on the company’s books. 
The process is reversed when the firm experiences an upturn in product 
demand. The demand for variable inputs increases, and specialized work- 
ers are reassigned from maintenance to the production of goods. Physical 
capital is more intensively utilized, and with less maintenance, it depreci- 
ates at a faster rate. To the extent that Okun’s law only deals with cyclical 
movements in the value of final goods Q (and ignores the countercyclical 
movements of  increments to implicit capital values), we get a biased 
picture of the cyclical behavior of “total” labor productivity. The magni- 
tude of the output response is muted if we followed the correct procedure 
and related changes in the value of  “total product” (including internally 
produced increments to capital values) to changes in labor inputs.” 
The force of  these two themes-fixed  factor proportions in producing 
goods and intertemporal product substitutions-obviously varies across 
firms and industries. The high shadow price of  entrepreneurial time in 
large manufacturing firms raises the costs of monitoring workers as well 
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and wages. Hence, large firms should exhibit greater rigidities in prices 
and wages accompanied by discrete quantum adjustments in output and 
employment. The firm adjusts to a downturn by  closing down entire 
plants  and  shifts,  releasing  variable  labor  inputs,  and  placing  some 
trained workers on temporary layoffs. The specialized workers who are 
retained are diverted to the nonmarket activities of rebuilding human and 
nonhuman capital. At the other end of the size distribution, small entre- 
preneurs confront a lower opportunity cost of  time. They are better 
suited to monitor workers in adaptable production teams, and more 
importantly, they can negotiate frequent changes in prices and wages. 
Although a recession may drive many small firms into bankruptcy, the 
surviving small firms may, as a result of their flexibility, experience less 
volatility in output and employment. King (1923) found, for example, 
that the reductions in  employment in  the recession of  1920-22  were 
relatively greater in large firms, as revealed by the data of  table 2.2. 
Employment in the volatile manufacturing sector is heavily concen- 
trated in large firms. In this sector, fixed factor proportions and intertem- 
poral substitutions in the production of goods versus internal investments 
are likely to produce strong procyclical movements in labor productivity. 
In other sectors, small firms with flexible prices and adaptable production 
teams should exhibit weak procyclical or even countercyclical patterns in 
the ratio of  output to employment. 
2.3.4  Impact of  Firm Size on Compensation 
and the Composition of  Employment 
Fixed employment costs are incurred to recruit and train afirm-specific 
labor force. The amount invested in and the returns to specific human 
capital will be larger, the greater the durability of the asset measured by 
the worker’s expected job tenure. The retention rate is a function of the 
level and structure of  compensation, the quality of working conditions, 
and the composition of  the firm’s labor force. The design of a compensa- 
tion package and the selection of new employees are clearly more impor- 
tant to those firms that make large investments in specific human capital. 
Total employee compensation (TEC) is the sum of gross wages plus 
employer contributions for fringe benefits; TEC = WH  + BH,  where W 
is the hourly wage rate, H  denotes total paid hours (the sum of  hours 
actually worked Hw  plus paid leisure hours HL  for vacations, holidays, 
sick leave, etc.), and B is the employer outlay for fringes converted to an 
hourly rate. The total hourly compensation of employees which appears 
in government  publication^^^ is given by C = (TEC/H) = W + B.  But Cis 
not the right measure for the compensation component of  full labor 
costs.” A better measure is provided by compensation per hour actually 
worked,  which  I  shall call pay, C* = (TEC/Hw)  = C/(1 -  +), where 85  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
Table 2.2  Employment, Hours, and Earnings for Selected Quarters, 
1920-1922 
All Industries  Factories 
Firm Size  1920:3  1921:3  1922:l  1920:3  1921:3  1922:l 
Number of  Employees 
1-21  10,110  9,843  8,739  1,360  1,251  1,121 
22-99  4,630  4,084  3,956  1,950  1,541  1,573 
100 +  14,440  11,151  11,452  8,060  5,668  5,927 
Total  29,180  25,078  24,147  11,370  8,460  8,621 
Scheduled Full-Time Weekly Hours 
1-21  54.1  53.9  53.0  52.1  51.9  51.0 
22-99  52.0  51.4  51.3  51.8  50.4  49.9 
100 +  49.1  48.3  47.8  50.1  49.1  49.3 
Total  51.3  51.0  50.3  50.7  49.7  49.6 
Actual Weekly Hours 
1-21  52.9  52.7  51.7  51.0  50.8  49.7 
22-99  48.6  48.8  49.0  46.2  47.2  46.3 
100 +  48.9  45.5  45.6  49.0  44.4  45.7 
Total  50.3  48.8  48.1  48.7  45.9  46.3 
Average Hourly Earnings 
1-21  0.44  0.43  0.44  0.50  0.52  0.54 
22-99  0.56  0.54  0.52  0.58  0.56  0.54 
100 +  0.63  0.57  0.56  0.64  0.56  0.53 
Total  0.55  0.51  0.51  0.61  0.56  0.53 
Source:  W. I. King, Employment, Hours, and Earnings in Prosperity and Depression (New 
York: National Bureau of  Economic Research,  1923), pp. 30, 82, 87, 113. 
+ = HL/H  is the paid leisure ratio describing the fraction of  total paid 
hours that the worker can take in leisure. The components of employee 
compensation from two surveys are summarized in table 2.3. In the BLS 
survey of  all establishments in the private business sector, the hourly 
wage W was only 78.1 percent of pay per workhour C*;  it was only 70.3 
percent in the Chamber of  Commerce survey of  large firms. Establish- 
ments in the BLS survey reported giving an average of four weeks of paid 
leisure, while the large firms in the CC survey gave nearly seven weeks.34 
Fringe benefits B accounted for 15.5 and 19.1  percent of total compensa- 
tion in the two surveys. Roughly 40 percent of  these fringes were legally 
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Table 2.3  Components of Total Employee Compensation 
Item 
Bureau of  Chamber of 
Labor Statistics  Commerce 
1977  Ratio”  1979  Ratiob 
Gross hourly wage, W  6.28  2.18  7.311  2.37 
Compensation per paid hour, C  7.43  2.32  9.037  2.52 
Compensation per workhour, C*  8.04  2.37  10.387  2.59 
Paid leisure percentage, +  7.59  1.29  13.00  1.23 
Legally required benefits, BLR  0.51  3.00  0.658  3.60 
Total benefits, (B + +W)  1.63  3.33  2.680  3.26 
Sources:  U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 1980. “Employee Compensation in the Private 
Nonfarm Sector, 1977.” Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office. U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. 1981. “Employee Benefits: .Historical Data, 1951-79.”  Washington, D.C. 
NOTE:  All figures except for C* and I$  are in current dollars per paid hour. 
”Ratio  of the 1977 value to the  1967 value. 
bRatio of the  1979 value to the 1969 value. 
Employer benefits, B  1.15  3.59  1.730  3.49 
insurance. Differences by occupation and industry from the BLS survey 
are shown in table 2.4, and the CC data for some twenty industries appear 
in table 2.5. 
The relation of wage to pay can be described by the ratio W/C*.  Recall 
that C = W + B, and C* = C/(1 -  +), so that 
w-  1-4) 
B‘  1+- 
W 
C* 
Reference to table 2.6  reveals that the wage to pay ratio, W/C*,  fell from 
83.1 percent in 1951 to 70.4 percent in 1979. This secular trend resulted 
from increases in both the benefits rate BIW and the paid leisure ratio +. 
Legally required supplements BLR accounted for 18.4 percent of  total 
benefits (B  + +W)  in 1951  and 24.6 percent in 1979. I conjectured that as 
BLR  rose, private fringes would fall so that the sum (as a percentage of 
total compensation) would remain roughly stable. Although private pen- 
sion contributions grew more slowly than social security, it increased in 
relation to total compensation. 
The cross-sectional industrial dispersion in the W/C*  ratio is substantial 
(table 2.5), ranging from 83.5 percent in textile mills to 65.4 percent in 
petroleum. The relative importance of  fringe benefits is greater in the 
regulated public utilities, banking, and the public sector. The variance in 
W/C*  is largely attributable to variations in the paid leisure ratio. Em- 
ployees in chemicals and public utilities get more than eight weeks of paid 
leisure, while workers in retail trade got only four weeks. The data of 
table 2.7, showing the percentage of  workers receiving three selected Table 2.4  Employee Compensation in the Private Nonfarm Sector,  1966 and 1977 
All Employees  Office Workers 
1966  1977  1966  1977 







W = Wage (average hourly earnings per paid hour) 
3.40  8.04  4.51  9.96 
3.67  8.82  5.28  11.80 
3.23  7.68  4.15  9.42 
2.88  6.28  3.79  7.74 
3.05  6.64  4.36  8.80 
2.77  6.11  3.52  7.42 
4 = Paid leisure percentage (paid nonworkhours/paid  hours) 
All industries  5.9  7.3  7.5  8.2 
Manufacturing  6.8  8.9  8.3  9.6 
Nonmanufacturing  5.3  6.5  7.2  7.7 
W/C*  = Wage as percentage of  compensation per workhour 
All industries  84.7  78.1  84.0  77.7 
Manufacturing  83.1  75.3  82.6  74.6 
Nonmanufacturing  85.4  79.6  84.8  78.8 
All industries  5.31  6.86  3.84  5.42 
Manufacturing  4.97  6.61  3.51  5.11 
B,,/C  = Legally required benefits to compensation per paid hour 
Nonmanufacturing  5.23  6.99  3.90  5.59 
Nonoffice Workers 
1966  1977 
2.92  6.96 
3.17  7.77 
2.75  6.49 
2.48  5.44 
2.64  5.86 
2.36  5.18 
5.1  6.7 
6.3  8.4 
4.4  5.4 
84.9  78.2 
83.3  75.4 
85.8  79.8 
6.14  8.01 
5.72  7.31 
6.46  9.80 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1980. “Employee Compensation in the Private Nonfarm Economy, 1977.” Summary 80-5. Table 2.5  Employee Benefits in Large Companies by  Industry 
Industry 
Compensation per  Wage to Compensation  Paid Leisure Ratio 
Workhour,  C*  Ratio, (W/C*)  4) 
1967  1973  1979  1967  1973  1979  1967  1973  1979 
















































































































































70.4  10.6 
70.2  10.3 
70.5  11.9 
83.5  6.9 
70.8  8.9 
71.6  10.4 
66.0  13.6 
65.4  15.1 
71.6  10.8 
70.7  10.3 
66.9  10.3 
70.8  9.3 
70.4  10.2 
70.2  10.9 
68.9  10.9 
70.8  10.9 
70.8  11.3 
67.5  12.4 
73.7  8.6 
75.8  8.6 
68.5  11.8 
69.2  12.1 
75.6  X 
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Source:  U.S. Chamber of  Commerce. 1981. “Employee Benefits: Historical Data, 1951-79.”  Washington, D.C. 89  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
Table 2.6  Employee Benefits in Large Companies, 1951-1979 
(in current dollars) 
Wages to  Paid  Legal Req. 
Comp. per  Comp.  Leisure  Benefits  Wage 
Workhour  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  Index 

































































































Source: U.S. Chamber of  Commerce. 1981. “Employee Benefits: Historical Data, 1951- 
79.” Washington, D.C. 
fringe benefits, reveal that males in large firms are more likely to  get these 
fringes, implying lower W/C*  ratios. 
Several explanations can be offered for the secular growth in fringe 
benefits: (a) Leisure is a normal good, and as real incomes grew, indi- 
viduals demanded more leisure in the form of paid vacations rather than 
in shorter workdays. (b) The higher marginal tax rates which accompany 
higher wages reduce the net  “after-tax” prices of  certain fringes.  (c) 
Pensions and deferred pay account for a larger share of the compensation 
of  salaried employees and of workers in large firms who are likely to be 
more firm specific. More generous but less portable fringe benefits reduce 
labor turnover, thereby increasing the returns to specific human capital. 
In addition, deferred pay discourages malfeasance and shirking, thereby 
reducing monitoring  The cross-sectional differences in the wage 
to pay ratio are broadly consistent with the fixed cost hypothesis. Spe- 
cifically  trained  workers in  large  firms and high-wage industries  are 
provided with compensation packages that put more pay in the form of 
pensions. 
The W/C*  ratio has clearly declined over time and varies across firms 
and industries. Empirical  studies that fail to recognize the changing 
relation of W to C*  could contain serious biases.36  The increasing impor- 90  Walter Y. Oi 
Table 2.7  Percentage of Employees Receiving Selected Benefits 
(dl  industries by firm size, May 1979) 
Hourly  Group  Pension  Disability 
Firm Size  Wage  Health  Plan  Insurance 
All Employees 
1-24  4.90  34.1  21.1  8.2 
25-99  5.61  64.8  48.1  20.2 
100-499  6.26  76.4  70.8  33.0 
5w999  6.36  80.0  80.1  40.8 
1,000 +  7.33  85.6  88.5  55.1 
Total  6.23  67.4  61.9  33.7 
Male Workers 
1-24  5.63  41.9  23.2  11.0 
25-99  6.58  73.4  52.8  26.0 
100-499  7.43  83.7  73.3  41.1 
500-999  7.73  87.9  82.0  50.5 
l,OoO+  8.49  91.7  91.4  63.7 
Total  7.34  75.7  66.4  41.8 
Source:  Current Population Survey, May 1979, unpublished data. 
tance of  deferred pay suggests that the labor input is becoming more firm 
specific. Long-term contracts and quasi-permanent jobs are evidently 
assuming greater importance in the labor market. 
The organization of  production and the composition of  employment 
are obviously influenced by industrial affiliation. Within an industry, the 
Census of  Manufactures data show that the ratio of  production to non- 
production workers is inversely related to establishment size. Additional 
empirical regularities are revealed by data from the May 1979 Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Selected characteristics of  all employed per- 
sons by firm size and sex are shown in table 2.8, and similar data for male 
employees in manufacturing appear in table 2.9. The attributes identified 
in these tables are familiar, and I shall remark on only some of  them. 
Education. Larger firms demand more highly educated persons who have 
already demonstrated their capacity to absorb training. The relation is 
stronger for males and for salaried workers. In fact, there is almost no 
relation between firm size and years of schooling for hourly male workers 
in manufact~ring.~’  The patterns conform to the monitoring cost hypoth- 
esis in which more productive  workers  are matched  with more able 
entrepreneurs. 
Race, sex,  and city size. Nonwhites accounted for 9.5 percent of  em- 
ployed persons. The percentage varies across industries, but there is no 91  Fixed Employment Costs of Specialized Labor 
systematic relation to firm size. Females, who make up 44 percent of 
employment, are more heavily represented in smaller firms because of 
their propensity to hold part-time jobs. The percentage of  workers in 
cities with a population of  a million or more is unrelated to firm size. 
Part-time employment. Some part-time jobs are permanent, but many are 
staffed by temporary workers who require more supervision. In all indus- 
tries, 34.0 percent of  employees in small firms held part-time jobs, and 
this falls to 11.7 percent in the largest firms. Differences in monitoring 
costs could  have  been  responsible  for  this inverse relation which  is 
observed within an industry. 
Age and job tenure. Larger firms have older workers, and the relation is 
stronger for males. Table 2.9 reveals, however, that the mean age of male 
production (hourly) workers varies little across size categories. The strik- 
ing relation is that between years of job tenure and firm size. The mean 
duration rises from 4.04 years in small firms to 8.68 years in large firms. 
Longer job tenure generally corresponds to lower labor turnover rates 
which squares with the hypothesis that workers in large firms have more 
firm-specific human capital.38  Males and salaried workers who receive 
more training have longer job tenures. 
Hourly  wage  rates. Several economists have observed that wages are 
positively related to firm size.39  As one moves from small to large firms 
(<25 vs. 1,000 + employees), the average hourly wage in 1979 climbed 
from $4.897 to $7.327 for an unadjusted differential of  49.6 percent.40 
Workers at small firms are more likely to be females, hold part-time jobs, 
and have less job tenure and education. When Mellow (1981) included 
personal characteristics in a log-linear wage equation, the estimated firm 
size differential fell to 24.7 percent. The inclusion of union membership 
further reduced the differential to 14.3 percent.41 
Capacity utilization and shift work. When continuous production is dic- 
tated by technology, workers must be hired for around-the-clock opera- 
tions. However, in the vast majority of industries, firms can choose the 
length of the workweek of fixed capital by varying the number and length 
of shifts. The equilibrium capital utilization rate will be higher the larger 
the share of  costs attributable  to capital, and the smaller  the wage 
differential for shift work. According to Foss (1981), the workweek of 
fixed capital varied from a high of 140 hours in petroleum refining to a low 
of  42 hours in apparel. Instead of  the usual division into durables and 
nondurables, I separated manufacturing into two sectors by using Foss’s 
estimates of capital utilization rates.42  Some 81.5 percent of manufactur- 
ing employees worked on the day shift, and the percentage was higher for 
females and salaried workers. Nearly a fourth of  employees in high-use Table 2.8  Characteristics of Employees in All Industries by Firm Size: May 1979 
In Firms with an Employment of 
~~~~ 
Characteristic  Total  1-24  25-99  100-499  500-999  l,OoO+ 
All Employees 




Percentage of  workers: 
Female 
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No. of  workers  9,731  2,357  1,411  1,310  47 1  4,182 
Age  36.80  34.26  36.41  37.01  36.91  38.28 
Job tenure  7.62  4.34  5.80  7.26  7.85  10.18 
Hourly wage  7.340  5.628  6.583  7.426  7.729  8.490 Education  12.7  11.8  12.1  12.9  13.5  13.2 
Percentage of  workers: 
Nonwhite  8.3  8.7  8.2  8.3  7.9  8.2 
Part-time  9.2  17.8  9.4  7.0  7.2  5.3 
Union  28.2  9.1  21.8  30.2  33.8  39.9 
Pension plan  66.4  23.3  52.8  73.3  81.9  91.4 
Large cities  34.9  28.1  32.7  36.4  35.7  39.0 
Hourly workers  53.0  57.1  56.3  50.0  45.4  51.4 
Female Workers 
No. of  workers  7,570 
Age  36.0 
Job tenure  5.11 
Hourly wage  4.805 
Education  12.6 
Percentage of workers: 
Nonwhite  11.1 
Part-time  32.5 
Union  15.6 
Pension plan  56.1 
Large cities  35.1 
























































Source:  Current Population Survey, May 1979, unpublished data. Table 2.9  Male Employees in Manufacturing: May 1979 
In Firms with an Employment of 
Characteristic  Total  1-24  25-99  10M99  500-999  1,000  + 
Salaried Workers 


















































































45.1 Hourly Workers 
No. of workers  1,781  154  233  25 1  93  1,050 
Age  36.74  32.81  36.93  36.65  34.70  37.48 
Job tenure  8.75  3.92  5.89  7.54  8.13  10.44 
Hourly Wage  6.757  5.316  5.727  6.104  6.407  7.385 
Education  11.27  10.69  10.79  10.79  11.31  11.57 
Percentage of  workers: 
Nonwhite  9.0  9.7  9.4  7.6  7.5  9.2 
Part-time  2.8  9.7  7.7  2.0  2.2  1.0 
Union  53.6  15.6  25.8  43.0  55.9  67.7 
Pension plan  77.9  26.6  45.9  70.9  87.1  93.4 
Large cities  33.5  46.1  33.0  38.2  27.9  31.1 
(13.21)  (14.61)  (15.45)  (13.51)  (1  1.19)  (12.43) 
(9.32)  (6.09)  (8.11)  (8.76)  (7.89)  (9.75) 
Source:  Current Population Survey, May 1979, unpublished data. 
NOTE:  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 96  Walter Y.  Oi 
manufacturing worked on latehight shifts, and 14.2 percent in low-use 
manufacturing. There is a strong positive association between the per- 
centage on latehight shifts (the complement of  the percentage on day 
shifts) and firm size as evidenced by the data in table 2.10. It rises from 6.3 
to 27.9 percent in high-use manufacturing and from 5.7 to 18.5 percent in 
low-use. The higher incidence of  shift work in large firms is a conse- 
quence of the decision to engage in the volume production of standard- 
ized goods. 
Firm size is systematically related to differences in wages, the organiza- 
tion of  production, and the composition of  employment. The received 
theory of  labor markets acknowledges the presence of  heterogeneous 
workers, but we still cling to Marshall’s concept of  a “representative 
firm.” The latter convention must be abandoned to explain the empirical 
regularities exhibited in tables 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10. 
2.3.5  Monitoring and Fixed Employment Costs 
in a World of Heterogeneous Firms 
The uniqueness of afirm is essential for the existence of specific human 
capital. It is meaningless otherwise to speak about training that raises a 
worker’s productivity  in  one firm, while  leaving his productivity un- 
changed in other firms. If  that is a true result, that one firm must have 
been different from all others. Fortunately, firms are heterogeneous, and 
profits can be increased by incurring those fixed employment costs that 
are needed to recruit, train, and retain a firm-specific labor force. Firms 
can differ in many ways, and the dimension which I have emphasized is 
that of entrepreneurial ability. Able entrepreneurs have the capacity to 
convert calendar time into larger supplies of  managerial effort which 
allow them, through the usual law of  variable proportions, to assemble 
large production teams. Following Lucas (1978), I assumed a background 
distribution of  entrepreneurial  abilities,  +(A),  which  yields  a  critical 
ability level A.  such that if  A <  Ao,  the individual does not become an 
entrepreneur.  The relative frequencies of  entrepreneurs of  moderate 
abilities [A just slightly greater than Xo in the truncated distribution of 
+(A)]  will be large, resulting in numerous small firms bearing a close 
resemblance to their neighbors. The rare, high-A entrepreneurs from the 
extreme right tail of +(A)  assemble very large corporations that are few in 
number. These giant firms are almost unique. 
Entrepreneurs enter different industries, and in each industry competi- 
tion produces an equilibrium size distribution of  Employment is 
an imperfect but readily available measure of size. Small firms are defined 
here as those with less than twenty-five employees, while large firms have 
one thousand or more workers. Firm size distributions vary across indus- 
tries. In all industries, 26.3 percent of  total employment was located in 97  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
small firms  and  39.3 percent  in  large.  The corresponding  figures in 
manufacturing were 8.3 and 57.8 percent. 
Talented entrepreneurs can economize on the time losses to monitor- 
ing and supervision in several ways. Production can be organized around 
teams and units, and authority can be delegated by stacking these teams 
in a hierarchical structure. The standardization of  products and proce- 
dures (exemplified by  the assembly line) limits the opportunities for 
discretionary behavior thereby simplifying the monitoring task. Capital is 
intensively utilized by operating multiple shifts. This mode of operation is 
profitable because of the high ratios of specialized capital to labor which 
accompany volume production  Further, the planning of production is 
extended to recruiting and personnel management. Job descriptions and 
task assignments are spelled out in great detail. Applicants are screened 
and tested to determine if  they can meet the rigid job specifications. 
Recruiting costs are higher in large firms which will hold job vacancies 
open until a suitable candidate is found. More highly educated persons 
are recruited to staff the salaried, firm-specific  positions, as evidenced by 
data in the top panel of  table 2.9. Specific training is provided to new 
employees to adapt them to the firm’s prescribed operating practices. 
These recruiting and training activities “produce” a labor force of reason- 
ably homogeneous individuals, and such teams are obviously easier to 
supervise. In a sense, higher fixed employment costs can be substituted 
for lower subsequent monitoring costs. Those firms that incur high fixed 
costs have a strong incentive to design selection and compensation prac- 
tices that reduce the turnover of specifically trained workers. If  firms are 
successful in retaining specifically trained workers, data on job tenures 
tell us something about the relative importance of  firm-specific human 
capital.45  Job tenures are longer (suggesting larger investments in firm- 
specific human  capital) for persons  who  are males,  are more highly 
educated, work at large firms, hold salaried positions, and are employed 
in industries which exhibit higher capital utilization rates. 
Less able entrepreneurs command smaller teams and produce custom- 
ized goods.” They spend less on recruiting because jobs are flexible and 
work can be redesigned to fit the individual applicant. Small firms have 
shorter life expectancies and hence have less to gain from firm-specific 
training and specialized durable machinery. Fixed employment costs are 
small, and labor costs are almost entirely composed of wages that must be 
paid to attract general human capital from competing employments. 
The behavioral differences among firms are confounded by the pres- 
ence of  unions. Some 22.7 percent of  all employed persons were mem- 
bers of  trade  unions  or employee  associations, and the membership 
climbs to 34.2 percent of  employees in large  firm^.^' On the supply side, 
there are likely to be scale economies in organizing workers, collecting Table 2.10  Wages, Age, and  Job Tenure in Manufacturing: May 1979 (by firm size) 
~~ 
A.  High-Use  Manufacturing 
In Firms with an Employment of 
Characteristic  1-24  25-99  1W99  500-999  l,OoO+  Total 
All Employees 
No. of  employees  126  163  237  89  1,223  1,838 
Percent day shift  93.7  89.6  79.3  77.5  72.1  76.3 
Hourly wage  5.256  6.069  6.482  6.997  8.012  7.405 
Job tenure  4.15  6.96  7.67  7.63  10.68  9.37 
Percent female  40.5  34.4  30.0  25.8  20.9  24.8 
Age  35.23  37.94  37.46  46.97  38.08  37.74 
Salaried Male Workers 
No. of  employees  18  29  60  25  338  470 
Percent day shift  88.9  100.0  93.3  88.0  87.6  89.1 
Hourly wage  7.924  9.774  8.998  10.361  10.855  10.413 
Age  37.44  44.93  40.52  42.32  40.55  40.79 
Job tenure  4.78  12.90  10.88  9.44  12.50  11.86 
Hourly Male Workers 
No. of  employees  57  78  106  41  630  912 
Hourly wage  5.422  5.902  6.084  6.517  7.552  7.061 
Age  32.23  35.49  35.31  35.10  37.84  46.87 
Job tenure  3.11  6.19  7.54  7.32  11.00  9.52 
Percent day shift  89.5  83.3  72.6  64.4  61.6  66.8 B. Low-Use Manufacturing 
In Firms with an Employment of 
Characteristic  1-24  25-99  100-499  500-999  l,OoO+  Total 
All Employees 
No. of  employees  212  358  387  145  1,132  2,234 
Percent day shift  94.3  90.2  90.4  82.8  81.5  85.8 
Hourly wage  5.423  5.449  5.709  6.075  7.185  6.412 
Age  35.33  38.16  38.65  34.96  37.65  37.51 
Job tenure  4.36  5.41  6.76  7.27  9.21  7.59 
Percent females  30.2  35.8  44.4  41.4  35.2  36.8 
Salaried Male Workers 
No. of employees  51  74  70  33  314  542 
Percent day shift  96.1  90.5  95.7  87.9  92.4  92.6 
Hourly wage  7.639  8.001  8.722  9.561  10.131  9.389 
Age  35.57  38.28  41.61  43.09  39.95  39.71 
Job tenure  4.86  6.31  7.57  9.48  11.40  9.48 
Hourly Male Workers 
No. of  employees  97  155  145  52  420  869 
Percent day shift  90.7  85.8  83.4  75.0  69.8  77.6 
Hourly wage  5.254  5.639  6.119  4.320  7.134  6.440 
Age  33.15  37.66  37.63  34.38  36.94  36.61 
Job tenure  4.40  5.74  7.54  8.77  9.61  7.94 
Source: Current Population Survey, May 1979, unpublished data. 
NOTE: The two-digit industries included under high use were industries 29,33,26,28,22,30,32,21,37,  and 27. The remaining industries  were put into low 
use. See note 42 of  text. 100  Walter Y. Oi 
dues, and enforcing compliance. The demand for unionism is also likely 
to be greater in larger firms for at least three reasons: First, a union may 
be the preferred institution to supply certain services of a public goods 
nature (e.g.,  grievance procedures, negotiating better working condi- 
tions, or resolving conflicts). Second, a union that can restrict mem- 
bership may be able to raise wages above competitive levels if  the host 
firm is earning economic rents. Third, big firms in small labor markets 
may have some monopsony power.  The data of  tables 2.8 and 2.10 
indicate that the incidence of  unionism is indeed positively correlated 
with firm size. 
Some interesting interactions are observed in table 2.11 which presents 
data for male production workers in manufacturing classified by firm size, 
job tenure, and union membership. The incidence of unionism was 58.3 
percent for the entire sample, and by firm size groups, the percentages in 
unions were 21.9 small, 46.5 medium, and 67.7 large. New employees 
with  less than one year  of  job tenure accounted for  17.1 percent of 
employment; this measure of the annual accession rate varied from a high 
of  35.0 percent in small, nonunionized firms to a low of  8.7 percent in 
large unionized firms. Holding firm size constant, new employees are less 
likely to be assigned to jobs on the regular day shift. The relative fre- 
quency of  shift work which reflects the firm’s capital utilization rate is 
considerably higher in the union sector, but the reason for this is unclear. 
High capital utilization rates may be associated with larger union wage 
gains, or trade unions may be better able to supply the services and 
contractual arrangements demanded by employees on latehight shifts. 
Wages of the blue-collar workers in table 2.11 are positively related to 
firm size and job tenure. The percentage wage gains due to size and 
tenure are larger in the nonunion sector, but in each sizehenure cell, 
unionized workers were uniformly better paid.“s  However, wage differ- 
ences understate the differentials in total employee compensation be- 
cause  union  workers receive proportionally  more  in  fringe benefits. 
Although collinearity makes it difficult to disentangle firm size and union 
effects, the data of  table 2.11 and the results reported by Mellow (1981) 
support the conclusion that other things equal, workers in large firms are 
paid higher wages and receive more fringes. These higher wages may 
contain elements of  economic rents or compensating differences for 
working conditions, or they may simply represent the equilibrium pay- 
ments to superior employees whose higher productivity cannot be linked 
to observable traits. The latter interpretation is in line with the monitor- 
ing cost hypothesis in which able entrepreneurs are matched with more 
productive workers. 
Based on data from two longitudinal surveys, Mincer (1981) reported 
that the wage-experience profile was flatter for unionized workers. Union 
members claimed that they got less “training” at their jobs which could 101  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
account for the flatter profile. However, an employee’s response to a 
survey question is not a reliable basis for estimating the amount of specific 
training that he has received. Further, the wage rate is  an imperfect 
measure of  pecuniary returns. A regression equation in which wages of 
employed persons are related to job tenures will yield a smaller slope 
coefficient relative to a second regression in which expected wages are 
related to job  Both regressions will understate the pecuniary 
returns to job experience. Unionized workers are covered by collective 
bargaining  agreements  and implicit long-term  contracts whose  com- 
pensation  packages  exhibit  the  property  that  the wage  to pay  ratio 
(W/C*)  falls with increasing job tenure; i.e., the value of  a union mem- 
ber’s claims to pensions and other fringe benefits rises with seniority. 
Expected pay per workhour is a better measure of pecuniary returns. We 
have to estimate regressions using an expected pay variable to determine 
if  the experience profile of  pecuniary returns is really flatter for union 
members. 
Finally, it has been observed that unionized workers receive a larger 
fraction of pay in the form of pensions and fringes. Mincer (1981) attrib- 
uted this magnification of  the demand for fringes to the fact that union 
members are more highly paid and hence face higher marginal tax rates. 
If true, the ratio of fringe benefits to wages should be larger in states that 
have higher state income tax rates. Alternatively, it can be argued that 
fringe benefits and deferred pay  are incorporated into compensation 
packages of  those firms (union and nonunion) that are trying to retain 
their specifically trained workers. Reference to the left panel of table 2.11 
reveals that in the nonunionized sector, the percentage of employees who 
are eligible for pension  plans  is positively related  to firm size. The 
phenomenon is not unique to the unionized sector. 
The data on job tenures are consistent with a model in which specific 
training assumes greater importance in larger and unionized firms. A 
tenured worker is defined here as one who has been with his current 
employer for five or more years. Table 2.11 reveals that 55.4 percent of 
male production workers  in  manufacturing were tenured, while 71.7 
percent of  employees in large unionized firms were tenured. For nonun- 
ion workers, the mean duration of job tenure was 2.7 years longer in large 
versus small firms, and the difference is due to higher retention rates 
during the first five years. Once workers pass beyond the five-year point, 
the conditional mean duration of  job tenure is unrelated to firm size.5o 
The job tenure differential between small and large unionized firms is 5.9 
years, and marginal retention rates appear to be higher in large firms at 
each year of service point. If  years of job tenure are subtracted from the 
mean age, we can derive the mean age of workers at entry. This exercise 
reveals that in large firms, tenured workers were recruited at younger 
Those individuals who obtain tenure at small firms evidently hold Table 2.11  Characteristics of Hourly Male Workers in  All Manufacturing: May 1979 
(by union status,  job tenure, and firm  size) 
Nonunion with Job Tenure of  Union with Job Tenure of 
Characteristic/ 
Firm Size  <1  1-5  25  Total  <1  1-5  25  Total 
No. of  employees 
1-99  106  107  90  303  19  27  39  85 
100-999  36  77  71  184  21  34  105  160 
l,OoO+  65  102  172  339  62  139  510  711 
Percentage on day shift 
1-99  80.2  86.9  95.6  87.1  73.7  85.2  94.9  87.1 
100-999  66.7  81.8  88.7  81.5  52.4  55.9  81.0  71.9 
l,OoO+  69.2  68.6  75.6  72.3  41.9  51.1  66.5  61.3 
Hourly wage 
1-99  4.571  4.964  5.691  5.042  5.099  6.717  7.813  6.858 
100-999  4.809  5.481  6.504  5.744  6.029  6.353  6.701  6.539 
l.OoO+  5.106  6.226  7.077  6.443  6.908  6.982  7.795  7.559 Percentage on pension plans 
1-99  25.4  25.2 
100-999  41.7  57.1 
l,OoO+  80.0  84.3 
Age in years (mean and standard deviation) 
1-99  29.06  30.07 
(13.42)  (12.58) 
100-999  24.97  31.95 
(8.69)  (11.81) 
l,OoO+  26.88  31.27 
(10.31)  (10.65) 
Job tenure in years (mean and standard deviation) 
1-99  -  2.36 
100-999  -  2.31 
























































































Source:  Current Population Survey, May 1979, unpublished data. 104  Walter Y. Oi 
several jobs before they find a suitable match with a viable firm that will 
remain in business for fifteen or more years. It would be interesting to 
discover whether the older tenured workers at viable small firms had 
received more or less firm-specific training in relation to tenured workers 
at large manufacturing firms. 
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
The labor market for the economy as a whole is populated by a wide 
diversity of workers and firms. The  entrepreneurs who control small firms 
confront a lower shadow price of  time which gives them a comparative 
advantage in monitoring worker performance, coping with disruptions 
and high labor turnover rates, providing maintenance for used equip- 
ment, and haggling over frequent changes in prices and wages. Their 
production teams include less experienced workers and more part-time 
employees. They apparently lack the organizational ability to operate 
multiple shifts. They choose to supply products where technology dis- 
courages standardization and volume production. Specialization and spe- 
cific training might be profitable if  the firm could be assured of  its survival 
and its ability to retain specialized resources. But such assurances cannot 
be supplied, even by  government regulation. Some workers obviously 
dislike the discipline and rigidity of employment at large firms and choose 
to work for small employers. They receive little or no specific training, 
are paid lower wages, and get relatively few fringe benefits. A relatively 
small number of  individuals form permanent  attachments with viable 
small  employer^.^^  However,  most  workers  in  this part  of  the labor 
market  possess general human capital that can readily be  shifted to 
numerous  small  firms that  are only  slightly differentiated from one 
another. The uncertain and possibly short lives of  these firms reduce the 
returns to specific investments, but this uncertainty is apparently not the 
source of  employment in~tability.~~  The important fact is that variable 
wage payments comprise almost all of the full costs of the labor input. A 
neoclassical model in which labor’s marginal value product is equated in 
each period to the market wage rate describes the behavior of  firms and 
workers in the portion of the labor market populated by “small firms.” 
The neoclassical model has been replaced by a loosely knit theory in 
which the labor market is characterized by implicit long-term contracts, 
rigid wages, formal layoff policies, lifetime tenured employment, de- 
ferred pay, and mandatory retirement.  Fixed employment costs are, 
according to Hall (1980), the glue that binds workers and firms together. 
The authors of  the new labor economics recognize that firm-specific 
investments in recruiting and training are endogenous, but they largely 
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assumed to focus attention on the implications of  a quasi-fixed labor 
input. 
The thesis advanced in this paper is that recruiting and training only 
make sense in a world of heterogeneous, differentiated firms. The heter- 
ogeneity in my model is generated by  a distribution of  entrepreneurial 
abilities. The outliers succeed in building very large corporations that are 
few in number and are spread across industries. Each very large firm is 
nearly unique. Managerial efforts are directed to the development of 
standardized products and the organization of  integrated but inflexible 
production lines. Companies make large investments in recruiting and 
training firm-specific labor forces. Workers in large firms are paid higher 
wages as well as compensation in the form of pensions and fringes that are 
designed in part to reduce the turnover of specifically trained employees. 
The full cost of  the labor input is thus the sum of  total employee com- 
pensation, the amortization of fixed employment costs, and the implicit 
costs of monitoring worker performance. Since wages represent only a 
part of  full labor costs, they are unlikely to be frequently adjusted in 
response to short-run changes in demand. The prices quoted by  large 
firms also tend to be rigid because every price change has to be closely 
supervised to prevent chiseling and cheating by numerous subordinates 
who staff a complex distribution network. Price and wage rigidities may 
have been responsible for more employment instability and may  also 
have contributed to an increased demand for outside representation of 
workers by organized labor unions.54  The specificity of  the labor input, 
personnel management, and the organization of  production along rigid 
assembly-line techniques have surely been influenced by  the shadow 
price of the entrepreneurial input. The structure of each firm is rationally 
determined to maximize profits in a world where there are trade-offs 
between monitoring costs and the fixed costs of  specialized resources. 
The portion of the labor market in which we find large firms is described 
by the perceptive picture painted by Hall (1982). However, it is a picture 
that applies to only a part of  the economy, albeit an important part 
containing at least 40 percent of  total employment. 
Specific human capital has proven to be an important concept in the 
theory of  labor economics. However, firm-specific capital can only be 
produced and employed in a segment of  the economy occupied by very 
large firms. The predictions of a theory that embraces this concept can be 
borne out by the empirical evidence if  these large firms account for a 
dominant share of the aggregate labor market. The empirical studies of 
the last two decades suggest that this is indeed the case. But there is 
another important sector of  the labor market where there is little room 
for specialized labor. The caricatures of the large and small firms in these 
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analytic prototypes picked from a continuum of  firm sizes, production 
adaptability, and labor specificity. Firms and workers are indeed heter- 
ogeneous. A theory of  labor economics that explicitly acknowledges this 
heterogeneity and incorporates it into its analytic models can, I believe, 
add considerably to our understanding of  the behavior of  labor markets. 
Notes 
1. Details of  the theory can be found in Oi (1962) and Becker (1964). Reder (1955) 
offered an alternative theory in which the cyclical changes in occupation wage differentials 
were explained by countercyclical variations in hiring standards that result in the upgrading 
and downgrading of employees. The Reder model must be tied to a theory of  factor demand 
shifts in order to explain employment responses. 
2. Hutt  (1977)  identified  six  categories  of  idleness:  (1)  valueless  resources,  (2) 
pseudoidleness which is defined as a state in which the capital value of an asset exceeds its 
scrap value even though its net hire value is nil, (3) preferred idleness exemplified by the 
labor-leisure choice, (4) participatory idleness in arrangements to share monopoly rents, (5) 
enforced idleness due, for example, to legal limits on workhours, and (6) withheld capacity 
to obtain monopoly rents. Idleness of the first three types constitutes an efficient allocation 
of  resources. 
3. Additional evidence and citations to the literature can be found in Clark and Summers 
4. This model helps to explain academic tenure; see Oi (1979). It also provides an 
explanation for mandatory retirement which is more fully analyzed by Lazear (1979). 
5. The rationale for this argument was developed by Becker and Stigler (1974). De- 
ferred pay can be viewed as an alternative to bonding, which puts the Becker-Stigler model 
in the spirit of  the principal-agent literature. 
6.  I was introduced to the Koike article by Hall (1982). In addition to his discussion on 
job  tenures,  Koike  points  out  an  important difference  in  trade  union  behavior.  The 
employment agreements negotiated  by  Japanese unions contain  no seniority rules  for 
layoffs and recalls. 
7.  Total compensation does not vary in direct proportion to man-hours because some 
components (e.g., disability and health insurance) are linked to the number of  employees 
rather than man-hours. The  nonlinearities in the relation of compensation to man-hours can 
be put into the fixed employment costs. 
8. A specially designed machine or plant can be purchased on a “made-to-order” basis. 
However, when such inputs are demanded on a regular basis, the firm is likely to engage in 
vertical integration to control the source of  supply. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) 
point to the concept of  “postcontractual opportunistic behavior” to justify vertical integra- 
tion in cases where the situation could result in a bilateral bargaining game. The  principle is 
illustrated by the acquisition of  Fisher Bodies by General Motors. 
9. The durability of  firm-specific human capital is jointly determined by the expected job 
tenure of  a trained worker and the rate of technical obsolescence/depreciation  applicable to 
such capital. Rapid changes in technology and in product demands increase the obsoles- 
cence rate, thereby reducing the durability of  specific human capital. 
10. Rosen (19726) constructed  a model in which inputs of labor L  and firm-specific 
knowledge Z produced two joint products in fixed proportions: output Q and an increment 
to knowledge AZ.  Knowledge is a permanent, nontransferable  asset which produces  a 
volume effect similar to the one examined by Alchian (1959). In a second model, Rosen 
(1979), pp. 53-54. 107  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
(1972~)  assumed that each multiproduct firm supplied its workers with work plus training 
that added to the workers’ general human capital. Employees recognized the composition 
of the tied package and were thus willing to accept lower wages which reflected the implicit 
market value of  general human capital. Training and work (the production of  goods) are 
presumably tied because of  some unspecified economies of  joint production. The econo- 
mies argument is more plausible when the training is firm specific. 
11. Suppose that the productivity of the ith individual, pi,  depends on inputs of general 
and specific human capital, pi  = p(Gi,  Si).  If  is homogeneous of the first degree,  is a 
function of the ratio (GIs).  The marginal product of  S is equalized when (Gi/Si)  = (Gj/Sj) 
for all i, j.  If market wages are proportional to general human capital, an optimal allocation 
of  specific human  capital will result  in  more S  allocated to individuals  with more  G. 
However, the degree of  fixity will be a constant. 
A positive relation between the wage rate and the degree of fixity can be derived by 
relaxing the assumption of first-degree homogeneity or  by introducing additional arguments 
into the p function. 
12. Alfred  Marshall and his followers were mainly interested  in issues of  allocative 
efficiency across commodities which were equated to industries. The concept of a “repre- 
sentative firm” was sufficient for this purpose, but it left little room for heterogeneity. The 
theory was mainly concerned with the determinants of  an optimum (equilibrium) firm size 
that could be reconciled with two maintained assumptions: (1) first-degree homogeneity of 
the  production function  and (2) perfect  competition  in factor markets. Kaldor  (1934) 
obtained a determinate firm size by appealing to the fixityin supply of at least one input. The 
proposition that firm size is ultimately limited by a scarcity of  the entrepreneurial input was 
also advanced by Robinson (1958), Georgescu-Roegen (1967), and Friedman (1976). I shall 
also invoke this same assumption. 
13. Capital is assumed to require no  monitoring. In the adjustment cost model of Lucas 
(1967), the installation of new capital entailed an opportunity cost of  forgone output. This is 
not the same as monitoring. In his distinction between man and machine, J. Clark (1923) 
pointed out the importance of  monitoring and metering worker performance: 
Having learned one way of doing a thing, a worker tries variants on it, sometimes with a 
purpose, sometimes aimlessly, but always following the bent of “monkeying.” 
very imperfectly adapted to continuous toil and when he does work, he works now faster 
and now slower with an irregular rhythm.  . . . Especially when working for a purely 
collective end, his ardors while often strong appear to be characteristically intermittent 
and unreliable.  As a class, he needs personal incentives  to work, rewards for good 
performance, and penalties for bad, more immediate and substantial than his share in the 
welfare of  the whole industry or the whole community. (p. 8) 
14. The shadow price of  an efficiency unit of  managerial effort is Pf,,  but a unit of 
calendar time yields A efficiency units so that entrepreneurial time has a shadow price of 
PAf,.  Since h hours are required to monitor each worker, we get the implicit monitoring 
cost, 6 = PAhf,. 
15. Homogeneity  implies that Q = KfK + NfN  + Tf,.  Substitution into the expression 
for  profits  yields  ?T = P(MAhf,+  Tf,).  Equation  (5) is  obtained  by  recalling  that 
16. If wages are proportional to productivity, W(p)/p will be a constant. In this event, 
[pW(p) -  W(p)] = 0, and in the presence of positive monitoring costs, all firms will try to 
substitute higher quality for fewer numbers. The resulting increase in demand for more 
productive workers will raise their wages. Hence, in equilibrium, W(p) must be convex so 
that W“(p)>O. 
17. Friedman (1976) explicitly acknowledged the presence of  heterogeneous firms in his 
analysis of  the relation of the firm to the industry. He  examined a case in which firms with 
different cost curves had to adjust to an increase in the demand facing the industry. If  the 
increase in product demand raises the price of a factor that is specific to the industry, the 
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quasi-marginal cost curve for an exceptional firm could bend backward; i.e.,  the exceptional 
firm contracts output in response to an increase in product price. Friedman did not try to 
explain the reasons for different cost curves. In my model, a dispersion of  entrepreneurial 
abilities generated cost differences wherein more able entrepreneurs enjoyed lower mar- 
ginal cost curves. 
18. Tailors, punch press operators, and door-to-door salesmen are often paid by “piece 
rates.” Such compensation methods can be implemented when output is easily observed 
and directly linked to particular employees. If  each worker in Adam Smith’s pin factory 
performed all tasks (sharpening the pin and placing the head on it), they could have been 
paid by the piece, thereby reducing monitoring costs. The gains from specialization and the 
division of labor evidently outweighed the monitoring cost savings. Payment by results may 
provide incentives for greater work effort which can explain its adoption in some firms. An 
analysis of  this method of  compensation can be found in Pencavel (1977). 
19.  Rees and Shultz (1970) found, for example, that a secretary’s pay was positively 
related to typing speed, but the relation was nonlinear. Only a small part of  the dispersion in 
pay could be explained by typing speed. A significant part of  pay evidently represented 
compensation for productive activities other than typing. The relation of  total productivity 
to length of  job service cannot be determined by observing only one dimension of  produc- 
tivity. 
20.  Alchian argued that unit costs will decline as a function of  the planned volume of 
output. Wright (1936) observed the same regularity in his study of progress functions in the 
production of  air frames. Oi (1967) explained the progress function in terms of intertempo- 
ral factor substitutions and the economies of joint production. Planned volume (batch size) 
is obviously important in designing the production organization. 
21.  The critical volume at which an assembly line constitutes the least-cost production 
method obviously depends on the product. The requisite volumes are likely to be large for 
goods like pogo sticks, toasters, and bikes, but a volume of  ten to twenty oceangoing oil 
tankers is sufficient to justify the construction of  an assembly line. 
22.  The compensating wage difference will obviously be larger, the larger the size of the 
team that is asked to conform to the same common schedule and working conditions, and 
the greater the dispersion in worker preferences. These results are rigorously derived by 
Deardorff and Stafford (1976). Union workers are typically employed in large firms which 
provide them with inferior working conditions. According to Duncan and Stafford (1980), 
the union wage differential cannot be interpreted as simply a monopoly return. Part of  it 
represents a compensating difference that must be paid to attract workers into accepting 
employment in less desirable work settings. 
23.  This implication provides yet another reason for the positive association between 
wages and firm size. Individuals who seek work at large firms will, on average, incur higher 
search costs because rigid job specifications will not be modified to meet individual worker 
differences. In equilibrium, larger firms must pay higher wages to compensate employees 
for the higher expected search costs. The fixed and flex-wage models of Pissarides (1976) 
incorporate the idea of search on the part of  firms. 
24.  If  input is more cheaply monitored, a master carpenter might teach his apprentices 
certain standardized ways of  performing various tasks. When all apprentices use the same 
work methods, the quality and quantity of  output may be more accurately and cheaply 
gauged by observing the input of  apprentice time rather than measuring the flow of output. 
Investments in entry-level training and screening could thus reduce subsequent monitoring 
costs. 
25.  The argument is put as follows: “In slack weeks, hours of  work are set at lower levels 
and the intensity of  work may fall as well. The general flavor of the arrangement is that 
workers work harder when there is much or more work to do.”  However,  in an earlier 
passage dealing with employment bargains for salaried workers, Hall writes, “Employers 
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Periods of  extraordinary  effort must be counterbalanced  by restful periods. For salaried 
workers, arrangements of  this kind develop by custom and are rarely spelled out in formal 
contracts.” But why are implicit arrangements preferable to explicit incentives for extra 
effort? We could  appeal to the difficulties of  enforcing contingent  contracts.  There is 
another weakness in the argument. If  “intense  effort”  can only be demanded for short 
bursts, we are still left with the puzzle of explaining Okun’s law which sometimes applies to 
adjustment periods extending over several quarters. 
26. Gordon and Walton appeal to Stigler’s concept of “adaptability” to explain the rapid 
postwar recoveries in Europe. Wars do not destroy productive factors in balanced propor- 
tions. As a consequence, the surviving stocks of  capital are not efficiently utilized. A small 
investment in a particular type of capital that restores the designed factor proportions can 
lead to a sharp increase in output. The installation of  a conveyor belt might, for example, 
enable a company to make efficient use of  its specialized but idle mining equipment. This 
investment will increase output and the output/capital ratio, but this does not contradict the 
law of  variable proportions as a principle applicable to the ex ante planning of  production. 
27. With only one technology and two types of labor, the latter effect dominates, and the 
cyclical adjustments generate a positive correlation between output changes and changes in 
the output/labor ratio. The pattern is, however,  attenuated by the presence of  diverse 
technologies because the standby  capacity usually has a lower output/labor ratio. The strong 
procyclical  behavior  of  labor  productivity suggests that the effect of  fixed proportions 
outweighs the influence of diverse technologies. 
28.  Shinohara (1962) reported that 40 percent of  the capital assets of  small Japanese 
firms were purchased as used equipment, compared to only 6 percent for large firms. The 
flow is evidently one in which new machines tend to be purchased by large firms and, as they 
age, some are sold to small firms. A similar pattern is observed in international trade. The 
high-wage,  industrialized  nations regularly  export  used  durable machinery  to less-de- 
veloped countries. Smith (1974) appeals to differences in relative factor prices to explain the 
trade in used assets. 
29.  The present  value of  the net  quasi-rents  that can be earned by a durable asset 
declines with age because of  rising maintenance  costs. A machine is scrapped when its 
present value falls below its scrap value. Parks (1979) analyzed the interactions of  mainte- 
nance, scrapping, and the replacement demand. Grunfeld (1960) provided an early empiri- 
cal study which emphasized the substitution of maintenance for investment. 
30.  The tacit assumption here is that capital can be more cheaply transported over time; 
i.e., increments to capital values depreciate more slowly than increments to inventories of 
final goods. Internal investments will be biased toward physical capital because the firm is 
contracting employment in a recession. 
31.  “Total product” is the sum of  the value of  final goods plus the implicit value of 
increments to capital assets. More maintenance during a recession reflects a firm’s rational 
responses to changing relative factor and product prices. When the prices of goods fall in 
relation to the shadow prices of  internally produced investments, the “output mix” under- 
standably shifts away from the production of  goods. 
32.  See, for example,  The Economic Report of the President, 1980, table B-37, p. 246. 
33.  In addition to employee compensation, full labor costs must include the amortiza- 
tion  of  fixed employment  costs. If  complementary  inputs of  protective  clothing, noise 
suppressors, and so forth are supplied by the firm, their costs are properly included in full 
labor costs. 
34.  I am unaware of  any studies that analyze the factors which determine paid leisure 
time across firms and industries and over time. Paid leisure hours HL  are like the “income in 
kind” in the British truck system analyzed by Hilton (1957). Paid holidays and vacations 
place a lower bound on an individual’s leisure time consumption. Additional leisure via 
absenteeism entails a loss of  earnings. Rest and recuperation may increase productivity, but 
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recuperation time? I am forced to appeal to an argument like Hilton’s in which workers are 
myopic, and merciful employers nudge them toward the “right” mix of work and leisure. 
Banks allegedly insist on vacations so that an employee’s books can be audited while he is 
away. The Rand Corporation gives their employees higher rates of  pay when they are on 
vacation because they need more money for travel and lodging. Finally, we have to explain 
why employees in the public sector and in social service agencies get considerably more paid 
leisure than workers in the private business sector. 
35. Postponing compensation may be an efficient means of  controlling executives and 
public servants. It discourages them from engaging in theft, larceny, and dysfunctional acts. 
The deterrent effects of  deferred pay must, however, be balanced against higher wages that 
can elicit greater work effort. 
The growing demand for private pensions may partially be traced to lower after-tax 
prices. Discontinuities in the structure of social security benefits may also help to  explain the 
growth. Failure to take early retirement at age 62 is accompanied by a loss in social security 
wealth. The defined social security benefits may not be enough to warrant full retirement as 
a utility maximizing choice. If  private pensions or savings were available to supplement 
social security, a worker could avoid the implicit taxation of social security wealth by retiring 
at age 62. Legislation that raised the defined social security benefits may have prompted the 
growth in employer contributions to private pensions. 
36. The supply of labor is not a function of  the wage rate but is, instead, a function of  pay 
per workhour C*,  working conditions, and anticipated future rates of  pay. In a demand 
study, the appropriate “price” should be the full labor cost. The data of  tables 2.4,2.5, and 
2.6 indicate that the wage rate is an imperfect measure of pay and probably an even poorer 
proxy for the full labor cost. 
37.  Although the CPS asked for the individual’s occupation, I classified respondents 
according to whether they were or were not “paid by the hour.” I shall refer to the hourly 
paid employees as production workers, even though this differs from the census definition of 
a production  worker. 
38.  In a steady state, the annual turnover rate is equal to the proportion of workers with 
less than one year  of  job tenure, but the mean  duration is determined by  the entire 
frequency  distribution.  The correlation  between turnover  and mean job tenure is thus 
imperfect, except in the special case where the functional form of the frequency distribution 
is the same across firms and industries. 
39.  See, for example, Lester (1967), Masters (1969), and Mellow (1981). Several argu- 
ments have been proposed to explain the firm size profile. Lester (1967) and Duncan and 
Stafford (1980) argued that large firms must pay higher wages which contain a compensating 
difference for less desirable working conditions. Employees must accept the greater disci- 
pline and rigidities of working in large teams. A slightly different argument was proposed by 
Stigler (1962): 
It is well known that wage rates are less in small plants than in large, and the difference 
reflects at least in part (and perhaps in whole) the lower cost of  the small-scale employer 
of  judging quality. . . . Men should in general enter smaller companies, the greater their 
ability. (p. 102) 
This argument is contrary to a model in which small employers are “small” because they 
lack the ability to judge and to organize large production teams. 
40.  The sample means shown in table 2.8 differ from those in Mellow (1981) because I 
excluded individuals who did not report the timing of work. The  timing question was used to 
determine the frequency of  shift work. 
41.  Mellow estimated two separate regressions. The coefficient of the largest firm size 
dummy variable fell to ,056 in the union regression and to .119 in the nonunion regression. 
The treatment of unionism as exogenous (either as a dummy variable or as a classificatory 
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42.  The Foss estimates are based on the 1976 Census of  Manufactures. The two-digit 
manufacturing industries wre divided into two groups as follows: 
Workweek of Fixed Capital in Manufacturing Industries, 1976 
High-Use Manufacturing  Low-Use Manufacturing 
Industry  Hours  Industry  Hours 
29.  Petroleum  140 
33.  Primary metals  119 
26.  Paper  115 
28.  Chemicals  112 
22.  Textiles  110 
30.  Rubber  108 
32.  Stone, glass  98 
21.  Tobacco  91 
37.  Transport. equip.  87 
27.  Printing  82 
Source: Foss 1981, table 2, p. 9. 
35.  Machinery 
20.  Food 
34.  Fabr. metals 
36.  Elec. machinery 
38.  Instruments 
24.  Lumber 
39.  Misc. mfg. 
25.  Furniture 
31.  Leather 












Over the period 1929-76, the capital utilization rate in manufacturing rose by 24.5 percent. 
43.  Although A was assumed to be an exogenous parameter, it can surely be influenced 
by economic forces. The process by which a chief executive officer is selected and retained 
varies across firms. In some cases, an owner-operator begins with a small firm and, through 
on-the-job experience, he gains the skills to expand the size of his team. In other instances, a 
candidate may be picked and groomed for the position, which is another way of saying that 
the firm is investing in specific human capital to raise the value of  A for this candidate. For my 
purposes, it is sufficient to assume that entrepreneurial ability A corresponds to firm size. 
44.  The  sparse use of part-time employees by large firms reflects their higher monitoring 
costs. Disruptions are also costlier when firms adopt inflexible production plans. Large firms 
enter into vertical integration to avoid unanticipated breaks in the supplies of raw materials. 
They purchase new as opposed to used equipment. They also invest more in safety to reduce 
the frequency of industrial accidents. The data on work injury rates examined by Oi (1974) 
clearly show that work injury risks are substantially lower in the largest establishments. 
45.  Job tenure is obviously an imperfect proxy for firm-specific human capital. Spe- 
cifically trained workers ought to remain with their employers for longer periods, but a host 
of  other factors affects the mean duration of  job tenure. These include things like the 
worker’s age, the cyclical volatility of  demand, the survival probabilities of  firms, wage 
levels, mobility costs, and so forth. 
46.  The customization may be evident in the product (the tailor-made suit), or it may be 
incorporated in other, not directly observable,  attributes such as credit terms, delivery 
service, or implicit warranties. 
47.  Unions and employee associations were combined in the CPS. I shall refer to the 
combined group as “unions.” 
48.  The impact of  unionism on wages has been extensively studied by  Lewis (1963), 
Mellow (1981), Mincer (1981), and in numerous  studies cited by Freeman and Medoff 
(1981). The union wage differential has increased in the 1970s. Over the course of  the last 
thirty years, the data reveal an upward trend in the ratio of  nonproduction to production 
workers in manufacturing. If  salaried nonproduction workers can be substituted for blue- 
collar workers, the rising union wage differential in the 1970s should have accelerated this 
trend. 
49. The expected wage is equal to the wage times the proportion of  the period that the 
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inversely related to seniority and that union members experienced higher layoff rates. Most 
unions  establish  seniority  rules  that  place  the burden  of  temporary layoffs on junior 
employees. 
50.  This conclusion is tentative.  I have not examined the job tenure distributions by 
single years which might reveal the source of  the difference in mean durations. 
51.  The age at entry for the ith worker, ai,  is the difference between his current age A, 
and his years of job tenure I;. The  mean age at entry can thus be calculated from the tables as  -- 
E=A-T. 
Constructed Mean Age at Entry of Tenured Workers 
(men with five or more years of  job tenure) 
Firm Size  Nonunion  Union 
~~  ~~ 
1-99  33.2  35.3 
100-999  30.1  28.7 
1,000 +  26.6  26.6 
Tenured workers at large firms joined their employers at a younger mean age (26.6  years) 
than the mean age of  all new employees in 1979. However, the tenured workers at small 
firms were drawn from the right side of the age distribution of  new employees. 
52.  Table 2.11 reveals that only 33.2 percent of male workers in small firms had five or 
more years of job tenure. Employment durations tend to  be shorter for at least two reasons: 
First, these jobs may serve as stepping stones and training grounds for new entrants. The age 
distributions of  employees in different industries show that young persons are more heavily 
represented in trade, personal services, and the low-wage manufacturing industries. This 
allocation  can be explained  by  a  reciprocal  search  process  in which individuals  seek 
high-paying jobs and firms look for suitable candidates. New entrants who lack job experi- 
ence and work histories may take jobs at small firms that provide little specific training, but 
these jobs enable them to establish track records documenting their reliability, honesty, and 
capacity to work with others. Second, the turnover of  small firms due to bankruptcies and 
takeovers are responsible for some job terminations. 
53.  The data of  table 2.2 collected by King (1923) indicate that in the recession of 
1920-22 the variability of employment was less in small firms. A perusal of data in County 
Business  Patterns also suggests that employment is less volatile in small establishments. 
However, both data sets describe the behavior of  employment for the aggregate of  firms in 
each size category and could thus conceal considerable churning among firms within each 
size group. It is unclear  how a prior  job affects the behavior of  a released  employee. 
Individuals who worked at  small firms possess only general human capital that can readily be 
transferred to many jobs. Workers who are separated from large companies may try to find 
an employer who can utilize his specific human capital. But if training is truly specific, it has 
little or no value to others. This reasoning suggests that specifically trained, unemployed 
workers (ignorant of  the nature of their human capital) are more likely to experience the 
long spells of unemployment  that were reported by  K. Clark and Summers (1979). 
54. The unionized  sector  in  manufacturing  is mainly located  in large  firms and in 
industries with high capital utilization rates. The unionized firms that have adopted rigid 
production techniques tend to experience greater employment variability, and the burden 
of  unemployment is mainly placed on junior employees. The evidence examined by Mincer 
(1981) and the studies cited by Freeman and Medoff (1981) indicate that the incidence of 
temporary layoffs is higher in the unionized sector. This finding in combination with the fact 
that premiums for unemployment  insurance are not based on actuarially fair experience 
ratings,  led  me  to the  tentative conclusion  that  the  present  unemployment  insurance 
program redistributes income from nonunionized workers to union members. This conclu- 
sion must await further empirical study. 113  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
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Comment  Ernst R. Berndt 
For quite some time now, Walter Oi has been working on ideas concern- 
ing fixed and variable labor inputs into production processes; the idle- 
ness, slack capacity, and utilization of  these fixed inputs; and implications 
for cyclical variations in the employment and wage rates of labor. Profes- 
sor Oi is very much aware of  the complexity of  the labor market. This 
paper represents, I think, Professor Oi’s converging ideas on how the 
labor market really works, and how its complexities can be unraveled and 
understood most usefully and succinctly. It is most appropriate that we 
open the NBER conference with Professor Oi’s paper, for it deals in an 
original  way  with  classic research issues that have a long and distin- 
guished tradition within the NBER. 
Essentially, the paper consists of three distinct essays, each dealing in a 
different way with  the single theme that it is fixed employment costs 
which provide the glue that binds together workers and firms. The first 
essay consists of a review and assessment of the literature dealing with the 
notion of labor as a quasi-fixed factor of  production. In the second essay, 
Oi summarizes search theory  and the implicit contract literature  and 
then analyzes implications for wage flexibility and turnover. In brief, Oi 
argues that search and implicit contract theories are in fact appropriate 
only  for one portion of  the labor  market, albeit  an important one, 
namely, large firms employing specialized labor. The third essay builds 
on the first two and sets out novel insights and hypotheses. Specifically, in 
this  essay  Oi puts forth a  somewhat different  notion  of  “dual  labor 
markets,” based here on the heterogeneity of  firms. 
I begin with a brief review of the first essay. Total labor cost to a firm 
consists of  variable wages paid to workers in return for a flow of  produc- 
tive services plus the periodic rent on the firm’s investment outlay in- 
curred while hiring and training its workers. Hiring costs include the 
direct costs of  recruiting and payroll processing, plus such indirect costs 
as those incurred in terminating, laying off  and recalling workers, and 
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incremental costs of unemployment insurance resulting from higher labor 
turnover rates. 
Following Gary Becker, Oi notes that training can either be general 
(when benefits could possibly be realized by several different employers) 
or specific (when benefits in the form of enhanced marginal productivity 
of the worker can be extracted by only one employer). In competitive 
markets, firms will provide general training only if the costs are borne by 
the recipient. When training is specific, however, competitive firms may 
willingly undertake investment costs, which will result in a wedge be- 
tween current marginal revenue product and the current wage, the wedge 
consisting of  the periodio rent earned by the firm on its investment in 
specific training. The  value to  the firm of any specific training investment 
can  be  increased  by  extending the expected  period  of  employment 
through, for example, offering different age-income profiles and more 
attractive pension plans (as has been argued by Donaldson and Eaton 
1976). 
Professor Oi notes that, in a production cycle, the timing of  demand 
changes for different labor types depends on the relative size of  the 
periodic rent in total labor costs, so that employment variations-both  up 
and down-are  less volatile and less frequent for workers with higher 
degrees of fixity. Oi neglects to mention here the fact that to some extent 
alternative hypotheses can produce the same cyclical behavior. For ex- 
ample, more than a decade ago Griliches (1969) put forward an hypoth- 
esis concerning technology, namely, capital-skill complementarity. Re- 
cently Morrison and Berndt (1981) have shown that when physical capital 
is the only quasi-fixed input, the elasticity of  demand for skilled labor 
with respect to output will be less than one if  and only if  skilled labor is a 
Hicks-Allen complement with physical capital. Given such capital-skilled 
labor complementarity, s%ort-run  increasing returns to aggregate labor 
can easily occur, even when skilled labor is a fully variable factor. Hence, 
somewhat different frameworks can “explain” the same procyclical phe- 
nomena. However, as Professor Oi notes, while the technological substi- 
tutability-complementarity story can explain relative shifts in factor de- 
mands, by itself it is unable to explain the exact timing of  employment 
turning points, the latter seemingly requiring at least some story on costs 
of  adjustment for physical capital and skilled labor.’ 
The above discussion points out, I believe, that the notion of  quasi- 
fixity of  certain inputs is related quite closely to the notions of  Lucas 
(1967a, b) and Treadway (1971) concerning internal and external increas- 
ing marginal costs of  adjustment. I would have preferred to have seen 
Professor Oi provide a more detailed and rigorous comparison of  these 
two conceptual frameworks. I conjecture that the Oi quasi-fixed factor, 
static equilibrium framework is more likely to yield corner solutions, 
since in the Lucas-Treadway dynamic framework, adjustment costs are 118  Walter Y. Oi 
increasing at the margin in  a continuous way.  Also, in the empirical 
review, I would have liked to have seen some discussion of the contribu- 
tions of  Brechling (1975) and Nadiri and Rosen  (1973) in which the 
cyclical behavior  of  employment is broken down into number of  em- 
ployees and average hours at work per employee. 
In his second essay, Professor Oi begins by noting that quasi-fixity, a 
demand notion, cannot by itself explain the sluggish response of wages to 
changes in aggregate demand or the persistence of  involuntary unem- 
ployment. For some time now, a number of  economists have viewed a 
great deal of  unemployment as frictional, voluntary, and in some sense 
“optimal,” since in this view persons are envisaged as investing time and 
resources while unemployed into searching for, finding, and securing 
better paying and more satisfying jobs. As noted by Professor Oi, such 
search models tend to imply large flows into and out of  unemployment, 
with  only a thin  tail of  individuals experiencing long unemployment 
spells. Recent empirical studies cited by Oi cast considerable doubt on 
the  quantitative  significance  of  such  search  behavior.  For  example, 
according to Clark and Summers, turnover and search accounted for only 
about one-fourth of 1  percent of unemployment, and in fact 64 percent of 
job changes were made with no intervening spell of unemployment at all. 
Moreover, Clark and Summers observed that most workers take the first 
job offer received, with this job lasting typically less than two years. In 
such a world, the assumption that search can be conducted more effi- 
ciently when unemployed must be rejected-it  is irrational for a person to 
remain unemployed in order to allocate time to job search. Oi concludes, 
therefore, that such search theories which rationalize voluntary unem- 
ployment are not very useful empirically. 
While search theories examine the behavior of  an individual seeking a 
permanent job, contract theories based on different attitudes toward risk 
by firms and workers attempt to explain the behavior of firms in designing 
compensation packages and employment policies that attract and retain 
“permanent” workers. If  the benefits of  risk sharing and the costs of 
mobility are important to workers, and if  fixed employment costs com- 
prise a substantial portion of  a firm’s total labor cost, then one would 
expect to observe job durations with long mean tenure. Arguing both 
analytically and with the benefit of  empirical research, Oi contends that 
such behavior is to be found only in sectors of the economy consisting of 
large firms. For example, Oi cites empirical research  results recently 
reported by Hall indicating that a representative worker could be ex- 
pected to hold ten jobs over a lifetime, and that by age thirty, 40 percent 
of workers will be at a job they will hold on average for twenty years. Hall 
also reports that the time profile of employment turnover is most impor- 
tant: job tenure turbulence is high during the first five to ten years in the 
labor force, when young people experience high turnover rates in search 119  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
of “permanent” lifetime jobs. As their ages increase, more workers settle 
into permanent jobs lasting for twenty or more years. 
Oi concludes this essay by noting that firms and individuals are heter- 
ogeneous and therefore exhibit different patterns of  fixed employment 
costs and job tenure. Specifically,  a marginal firm whose survival probabi- 
lities are  slim is unlikely to make substantial investments in recruiting and 
specific training; hence, argues Oi, small firms should be expected to be 
less interested in contracting. Moreover, an individual with few assets 
and only general training will tend to be less interested in incurring the 
high  fixed costs of  job search; hence  younger  and generally trained 
workers should be expected to be less interested in searching. By con- 
trast, large stable firms are more interested in contracting, and experi- 
enced workers with some specific training have more incentive to search. 
This then brings us to the third essay in which Professor Oi displays his 
considerable skill as an insightful and strategic  craftsman. The notion that 
both employers and employees are heterogeneous has been around for 
quite some time and has been formalized in a number of stochastic search 
and contract models. Oi, however, strategically simplifies by suggesting a 
particular structure to the forms of the underlying distributions. Let there 
be two groups of  firms-call them giants and small firms (the firm is 
viewed as a team in the sense of  Alchian and Demsetz-more  on this 
later). Let there also be two types of workers-those  with general human 
capital training and those with specific training. A firm that “produces” 
quasi-fixed labor inputs can be thought of  as a multiproduct firm whose 
outputs are the regular products plus laborers embodying additional 
specific training.2 More specific capital will be invested in those indi- 
viduals who have longer expected employment tenures and who can 
manifest larger productivity increases through training. Oi then suggests 
that specific training would be concentrated on more highly skilled and 
malleable/educable workers; this implies a positive relation between the 
current wage rate and the degree of  fixity. 
Turning then to the heterogeneity of firms, Oi identifies and highlights 
several systematic differences in the way heterogeneous firms organize 
their production. First, firms differ in their ability to exploit internal gains 
of specialization. The central agent performing this task for the team is 
the entrepreneur (coach) who both supplies managerial input and moni- 
tors worker performance. Hence the full labor costs of  a worker to the 
firm include at least the wage rate and the cost of  monitoring perform- 
ance. Differences in workers and entrepreneurs are described in terms of 
two parameters: p, the implicit monitoring costs each worker generates 
by being employed, and A, the ability of entrepreneurs to transform hours 
into effective managerial input. High-A entrepreneurs are found in large 
firms, for they supply more effective managerial input, thereby increasing 
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these high-A entrepreneurs have a comparative disadvantage in monitor- 
ing  performance,  they  attempt  to  compensate  by  adopting  capital- 
intensive production methods and by hiring more productive workers 
who command higher wages. But how do giant firms with assembly-line 
and batch  production processes reduce monitoring costs of  workers? 
Here Oi evokes the old image of  IBM employees. New employees at 
giant firms receive more firm-specific training which “adapts” them to a 
particular  team production process,  encourages  compliance with the 
prescribed job description, and teaches them preferred ways of perform- 
ing tasks. When all of the team’s members are more or less homogeneous 
and work in the same way, monitoring costs can be sharply reduced. In a 
sense, then, large firms substitute additional fixed employment costs now 
for lower monitoring costs later on. For small firms producing more 
customized  outputs,  the  fixed  costs  of  assembling  and  training  a 
homogeneous team may not be warranted. Hence, in Oi’s view, since it is 
the entrepreneurial input that is most scarce, differing firms organize 
production teams and supply those kinds of products in various ways, 
each so as to yield the largest return to the scarce entrepreneurial input. 
Turning to somewhat related issues, Oi notes that capital typically 
requires  maintenance which in turn, he suggests, necessitates use of 
specific-trained workers.’ Maintenance, however,  is a labor-intensive 
activity requiring extensive monitoring. Firms facing high wages and high 
monitoring costs will tend to substitute new machines for lower mainte- 
nance. Such substitution between maintenance and investment can occur 
across time in response to cyclical fluctuations in marginal productivi- 
ties-more  maintenance in recession when the marginal revenue product 
of production work is lower, and correspondingly less maintenance and 
more production  in  the upturn.  Assignments  of  specific workers  to 
maintenance  and training  from  the production of  goods is therefore 
countercyclical and can help explain Okun’s observed, short-run, in- 
creasing return to labor. I might add here that I have not seen much 
evidence yet that in the current recession workers are devoting more time 
to rebuilding human and nonhuman capital, nor that this rebuilding is 
greater, as Oi would suggest, in large, capital-intensive firms. One indus- 
try worth examining in this regard is the electric utility industry, for its 
variations over time in excess capacity are well known, good data are 
available, and it does not contain the additional problem of using output 
inventories as a buffer stock, for electricity is not easily stored. 
Turning  now  to the  compensation of  fixed  factors,  Oi notes  that 
perhaps more generous but less portable fringe benefits reduce labor 
turnover and thereby increase the capitalized value of specific training. 
Moreover, deferred payment in the form of pensions discourages malfea- 
sance and shirking of  tasks by employees, thereby reducing monitoring 
costs.  Oi points to evidence that deferred compensation is  becoming 121  Fixed Employment Costs of  Specialized Labor 
increasingly important, and from this he concludes that in the United 
States labor is becoming more firm specific. In my judgment, such an 
important conclusion is not yet warranted on the basis of the evidence Oi 
cites. Some of  the recent increasing importance of deferred compensa- 
tion and pensions may be due simply to the changing age distribution of 
the labor force, and some may also be due to the U.S. experience of wage 
and price controls in the 1970s, compliance with which created incentives 
for firms to increase the fringe and deferred payment items of  the com- 
pensation package. Moreover,  if Oi’s hypothesis were true, labor produc- 
tivity should  be more procyclical today  than  before.  I recall  recent 
Economic Reports of  the President in which it was mourned that in the last 
decade, during upswings, labor productivity had risen much less than 
previously. Also, is labor productivity more procyclical in the capital- 
intensive manufacturing sector today than in the service sector? I know of 
no careful study on this issue. 
In the closing pages of  his paper, Professor Oi examines empirical 
relationships among firm size, wage rates, education, race and sex, age 
and job tenure, capacity utilization, shift work, and unionization. The 
remarkable and, I think, most significant feature of  Oi’s paper is that 
fixed employment costs and the particular highly structured heterogene- 
ity he envisages among firms and individuals has clear implications for the 
signs of  correlations among these variables. My only criticism is that, by 
and large, the  way in which Oi examines these relationships empirically is 
just two at a time, using bivariate regressions or simple correlations. The 
rich set of testable hypotheses generated by Professor Oi  deserves a much 
more careful and detailed examination within a multivariate regression 
and partial correlation framework. 
This paper suggests numerous directions for future research, in addi- 
tion to those noted by Oi and suggested by  me earlier. Specifically, I 
would hope that, in the future, attempts be made to obtain direct esti- 
mates of  fixed employment costs over time and space, that dynamic 
optimization be incorporated more explicitly, that implications of specific 
training for market structure be examined more carefully in a multi- 
industry framework, and that the empirical notion of the firm be consid- 
ered in greater detail. Regarding this last point, I am uncertain what best 
corresponds in the real world to the firm or team envisaged by  Oi, 
particularly given numerous recent mergers, growth of conglomerates, 
and heterogeneity of firms across countries such as the United States and 
Japan. 
These further research issues offer each of  us great opportunities. If 
only there were more applied theorists, like Walter Oi, whose insightful 
analyses generate such well-structured opportunities for important addi- 
tional empirical research. 122  Walter Y. Oi 
Notes 
1. See, however, section 4  in Morrison and Berndt (1981) on the issue of whether costs of 
adjustment are either necessary or sufficient for the existence of short-run increasing returns 
to aggregate labor. 
2.  This proposition was developed in the internal costs of adjustment literature about a 
decade ago by Brechling and Mortenson (1971, p. 5)  who stated that: 
The assumption that internal costs of  adjusting input levels exist is equivalent to the 
proposition  that the inputs used by the firm at one point in time are at least partially 
“produced’ by the firm at some earlier date. For example, the existence of  hiring and 
training costs imply that the raw material, a newly-employed worker, must be processed 
and modified in certain ways by the firm before his services are appropriate for use in the 
production process. . . .  In other words, the production rates and the time rates of change 
in input levels are measures of  jointly produced output and inputs, respectively. Hence, 
more rapid changes in input levels can be obtained only either at  the expense of output, if 
the firm’s resources are given, or by increasing resource levels, if output is maintained at 
some predetermined level. 
3.  Such a relationship  could generate the capital-skill complementarity  observed by 
Griliches (1969). 
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